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Abstract
Cross-subsidization arises naturally when rms with di¤erent comparative ad-
vantages compete for consumers with heterogeneous shopping patterns. Firms then
face a form of co-opetition, as they o¤er substitutes for one-stop shoppers and com-
plements for multi-stop shoppers. When intense competition for one-stop shoppers
drives total prices down to cost, rms subsidize weak products with the prot made
on strong products. Firms have moreover incentives to seek comparative advantages
on di¤erent products. Finally, banning below-cost pricing increases rmsprots
at the expense of one-stop shoppers, which calls for a cautious use of below-cost
pricing regulations in competitive markets.
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1 Introduction
Multi-product rms compete through a variety of pricing strategies. One commonly ob-
served strategy is cross-subsidization in which rms price some products below cost and
compensating the loss with prots from other products. Competition between Apple and
Amazon in e-book and tablet computer markets o¤ered an illustration. In 2010, Amazon
was selling the Kindle Fire below cost,1 when Apple pre-loaded 30,000 books free of
charge on the iBooks store.2 It was commonly recognized that Apples iPad o¤ered more
functions than the Kindle Fire, whereas Amazon, with more than two million e-books,
provided more variety and thus a higher match value than the iBooks store. Hence, each
rm had a comparatively stronger product in relation to its rival. Furthermore, both
rms were selling their comparatively weaker products below cost, and deriving prots
from their strong products.3 Moreover, consumers could combine the two rmsstrong
products, but not the weak ones: iPad users could download a free Kindle Application to
access Amazons e-books, whereas Kindle Fire users had no access to the iBooks store.
These strategies in such competitive markets as tablets and e-books are somewhat at
odds with the existing theory. According to this theory, cross-subsidization arises in the
context of regulated or monopolistic markets,4 or in markets characterized by frictions
such as consumerslimited information or bounded rationality (see the literature review
below). We develop here a new approach, based on the diversity of purchasing patterns.
1The Kindle Fire, which o¤ered access to the Amazon Appstore, streaming movies and TV shows,
was sold in the U.S. at a retail price of $199. Amazons hardware cost for a Kindle Fire was estimated at
$201.70, not including additional expenses such as software, licensing, royalties or other expenditures.
See https://technology.ihs.com/389433/amazon-kindle-re-costs-20170-to-manufacture.
2See Appleinsiders report, available at http://appleinsider.com/articles/10/03/25/apple_loads_up_
new_ibooks_store_with_free_public_domain_ipad_titles.
3Before 2010, Amazon was also selling some newly released e-books below cost. However, it raised
the prices after Apple proposed the controversial agency model for e-books. More recently, Amazon
introduced more sophisticated version of its reader (e.g., the Oasis), which o¤er additional features. Still,
the pattern of cross-subsidizing weaker products with stronger ones appears to have persisted from 2010
to 2016.
4For instance, Faulhaber (2005, pp.442) asserts that under competitive conditions, the issue of cross-
subsidy simply does not arise.
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The literature on competitive multiproduct pricing often assumes that customers en-
gage in one-stop shoppingand purchase all products from the same supplier. Yet, in
practice, many customers engage in multi-stop shopping and rely on several suppliers to
fulll their needs. The choice between these purchasing patterns is driven not only by
the diversity and the relative merits of supplierso¤erings, but also by the transaction
costs that buyers must bear in order to enjoy the products. As mentioned by Klemperer
(1992), these transaction costs include physical costs such as transportation costs, and
non-physical costs, such as the opportunity cost of time and the adoption cost of using a
new electronic device. Following the terminology of the literature, we will refer to these
costs as shopping costs. Obviously, these costs vary across customers. For example,
some consumers may face tighter time constraints and/or dislike shopping, whereas others
may be less time-constrained and/or enjoy shopping. Indeed, some users, already familiar
with the Kindle system, may be reluctant to switch to the iPad because of the associated
learning costs,5 whereas others may enjoy the adoption of a new device. All other things
being equal, customers with high transaction costs tend to favor one-stop shopping,
whereas others are more prone to multi-stop shopping.
We rst note that the diversity of purchasing patterns gives rise to a form of co-
opetition: on the one hand, rms o¤er substitutes for one-stop shoppers, who look
for the best basket of products; on the other hand, rms o¤er complements for multi-
stop shoppers, who seek to combine suppliersbest products. We show that this duality
drastically a¤ects rmspricing strategies and can lead to cross-subsidization, even in
competitive markets.
Specically, we consider a setting in which two rms o¤er the same product line (which
consists of two products, for simplicity). Consumers are perfectly informed about prices,
as is indeed the case for e-books and tablets. To discard price-discrimination motives, we
further assume that consumers have inelastic demands. Altogether, these assumptions
allow us to abstract from the motivations already highlighted in the literature on cross-
subsidization (see the literature review below). Our key ingredients are instead that: (i)
consumers have heterogeneous shopping costs; and (ii) through lower costs and/or higher
5Before the launch of the iPad and the Kindle Fire, readers of Amazons e-books were mainly using
the original Kindle device.
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consumer value, each rm enjoys a comparative advantage over one product. For the
sake of exposition, we initially assume that rms have similar comparative advantages;
that is, each rm has a stronger product than its rival, but overall their baskets generate
the same surplus. In equilibrium, consumers with high shopping costs engage in one-
stop shopping, and competition for these consumers drives rmsaggregate prices down
to costs. By contrast, consumers with low shopping costs engage in multi-stop shopping
and buy each rms strong product, by which means the rms make a prot. Cross-
subsidization therefore arises naturally, with each rm pricing its weak product below
cost and subsidizing the resulting loss with the prot from its strong product.
This provides some insights on the outcome of co-opetition. On the one hand, aggregate
price levels are competitive: rms supply one-stop shoppers at cost. If rms could
coordinate their pricing strategies, they would raise total prices in order to exploit one-
stop shoppers. At the same time, however, a lack of coordination over the prices charged
to multi-stop shoppers leads to double marginalization, as each rm charges a margin
on its strong product. This causes excessive cross-subsidization and results in not enough
multi-stop shopping: limiting cross-subsidization would benet both rms and consumers.
These insights are quite robust and remain valid in more general environments. We
extend the analysis to the setting with heterogeneous consumer preferences and show that
rms cross-subsidize weak products as long as competition for one-stop shoppers remains
su¢ ciently intense and/or the number of consumers who demand the weak product only
is relatively small. We also show that the analysis applies when the dispersion of shopping
costs is limited (as long as both shopping patterns arise in equilibrium), or when one rm
o¤ers a better basket than the other, thus enjoying market power over one-stop shoppers.
We then explore the implications of these insights for rmsproduct positioning. We
do so by introducing a preliminary stage in which they can improve their o¤erings (e.g., by
investing in quality or cost reduction, or by dedicating more resources to negotiating better
conditions with their suppliers). We nd that rms have incentives to target di¤erent
products, which gives rise to asymmetric comparative advantages such as described above
regardless of whether improvement decisions are public or private, and of focussing on
pure or mixed strategies.
The prevalence of cross-subsidization in retailing markets has led many countries to
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adopt specic regulations prohibiting or restricting certain forms of below-cost pricing.
These regulations are however quite controversial and have triggered an intense policy de-
bate.6 To shed some light on this debate, we consider a variant where rms cannot price
below cost. The equilibrium then involves mixed strategies: rms sell weak products at
cost but randomize the prices of their strong products. Banning below-cost pricing thus
results in higher prices for one-stop shoppers (who can no longer purchase the products at
cost), and greater protability for rms (in fact, their expected prots more than double).
The impact on multi-stop shoppers is less obvious. However, when weak products o¤er
relatively low value, there are few one-stop shoppers; hence, rms are not too concerned
about losing them and, as a result, charge higher prices to multi-stop shoppers as well.
Depending on the distribution of shopping costs, this reduction in consumer surplus may
exceed the increase in rms prots and thus result in lower total welfare. This sug-
gests that regulations on below-cost pricing in competitive markets should be carefully
evaluated.7
Related literature. Cross-subsidization has been extensively studied in the context
of regulated markets such as telecommunications, energy, and postal markets, in which
historical incumbents may ght entry by pricing below cost in liberalized segments,8
subsidizing their losses with the prots earned in protected segments. There is a small
literature of cross-subsidization in unregulated, competitive markets; however, it typically
assumes that consumers engage in one-stop shopping, and relies either on consumers
limited information or on bounded rationality.
In a setting where consumers are initially unaware of prices, Lal and Matutes (1994)
show that rms advertise a loss-leader product in order to attract consumers.9 Rhodes
6For instance, OECD (2007) argues that these laws are more likely to harm consumers than benet
them. See Section 5 for a more detailed discussion.
7By contrast, Chen and Rey (2012) show that banning below-cost pricing in concentrated markets
can discipline the pricing behavior of a dominant rm competing with smaller rms. Such a ban then
benets both consumers and smaller rivals, and enhances social welfare.
8Such an exclusionary motive does not appear relevant for the tablet and e-book markets. Amazon
can hardly hope to drive the iPad out of the market and, conversely, Apple is probably not primarily
aiming to exclude Amazons e-books.
9In equilibrium, consumers stop searching after the rst visit, and thus all consumers are one-stop
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(2015) develops a multi-product search model where competing rms randomly advertise
one product at a low price, and may even set its advertised price below cost. By contrast,
when consumers are aware of prices, Ambrus and Weinstein (2008) show that below-cost
pricing does not arise when consumers have inelastic demands or when consumers have
su¢ ciently diverse preferences.10
Ellison (2005) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) study add-on pricing and product
shrouding. Firms may price a leading product below cost (such as a hotel room fee) to
lure consumers and subsidize the loss with the prot from shrouded add-on prices (such as
telephone call charges and internet access fees). Grubb (2009) considers consumers with
behavioral biases (such as over-condence about the usage management) in the mobile-
phone-service market, and shows that such bias can lead rms to price below cost on some
units within a mobile-service plan. Recently, Johnson (2016) considers a setting in which
one-stop shoppers may underestimate their needs, and shows that below-cost pricing may
arise when consumers have di¤erent biases across products.11
In the case of tablets and e-books, as already noted, information about Apple and
Amazons prices was readily available to consumers. Furthermore, bounded rationality
may be less relevant for simple goods such as e-books than for more complex products
such as mobile telephony services. Yet, accounting for the diversity of purchasing patterns
enables us to o¤er a rationale for the observed cross-subsidization, even in the absence of
any limitation on consumersinformation and rationality.
Chen and Rey (2012) also accounts for heterogeneous purchasing patterns; however,
the two papers focus on di¤erent situations, and this leads to drastically di¤erent policy
implications. Our previous paper focused on markets in which a dominant rm (e.g.,
a platform monopoly or a large retailer carrying a broad range of products) competes
with smaller rivals (e.g., applications developers or specialty stores), and showed that
shoppers in their setting.
10They nd that below-cost pricing arises only when consumers have elastic demands exhibiting a very
specic form of complementarity.
11There is also a marketing literature on loss leading that focuses on impulsive purchases. For instance,
Hess and Gerstner (1987) show that rms can use loss leader products to lure consumers, who will purchase
some other products impulsively. Such impulsive purchases are similar to the unplanned purchases
analyzed by Johnson (2016).
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the dominant rm can protably engage in loss leading by selling competitive products
below cost. However, banning below-cost pricing then hurts the dominant rm, and it
unambiguously benets consumers (as well as smaller rivals) and increases social welfare.
By contrast, we focus here on rms with similar product ranges; cross-subsidization then
arises as a form of co-opetition, which allows the rms to extract surplus from multi-
stop shoppers while competing for one-stop shoppers. In this type of situation, banning
below-cost pricing then benets the rms, and unambiguously harms one-stop shoppers 
it is also likely to harm consumers as a whole, as well as social welfare.
The empirical literature on multi-product pricing and heterogeneous purchasing pat-
terns remains limited. For instance, the empirical literature on platform competition in
media or healthcare industries12 accounts the multiplicity of products (TV channels or
doctors & hospitals), but tends to focus on one-stop shopping, whereas the literature on
retail competition, where supermarkets o¤er a large number of products, tends to focus
on specic product categories, such as breakfast cereals or mineral water, or on store-level
competition (e.g., to assess the impact of a merger), thus ignoring shopping patterns. Re-
cently, however, Thomassen et al. (2017) provides an interesting quantitative analysis of
supermarket pricing that accounts for price e¤ects across product categories as well as for
the heterogeneity (and endogeneity) of shopping patterns. It nds in particular that di¤er-
ent product categories exhibit price complementarity within a given retailer, and that this
cross-category complementarity derives from the consumers shopping costs rather than
from any intrinsic complementarity between the categories. It also nds that competition
appears to be more intense for one-stop shoppers than for multi-stop shoppers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the baseline framework and
presents our main insights. Section 3 extends the baseline model to account for het-
erogeneous preferences, whereas Section 4 explores its implications for rms product
positioning. Section 5 studies the impact of a ban on below-cost pricing. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
12See, e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) and Crawford et al. (2018) for media, and Gowrisankaran
et al. (2015) and Ho and Lee (2017) for healthcare.
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2 Baseline model and main results
2.1 Setting
There are two product markets, A and B, and two rms, 1 and 2. Consumers are willing
to buy one unit of A and one unit of B. Each rm i = 1; 2 can produce a variety of
each good, Ai and Bi, at constant unit costs cAi and c
B
i .
13 Consumers have homogeneous
preferences, and derive utility uhi > c
h
i from rm is variety of good h = A;B.
14
Throughout the analysis, we assume that rm 1 enjoys a comparative advantage in
the supply of good A, whereas rm 2 enjoys a comparative advantage for good B. This
may reect a specialization in di¤erent product lines, and be driven by better product
quality (i.e., uA1 > u
A
2 ), a lower cost (i.e., c
A
1 < c
A
2 ), or a combination of both. For the
sake of exposition, we initially focus on the case where rms enjoy the same comparative
advantage for their strong products:
uA1   cA1  
 
uA2   cA2

= uB2   cB2  
 
uB1   cB1
   > 0; (1)
implying that their baskets o¤er the same total value:
uA1   cA1 + uB1   cB1 = uA2   cA2 + uB2   cB2  w > : (2)
Later on, we consider asymmetric comparative advantages and endogenous specialization
(see Section 4).
Our key modelling feature is that consumers incur a shopping cost, s, to visit a rm,
and that this cost varies across consumers, reecting the fact they may be more or less
time-constrained, or that they value the shopping experience in di¤erent ways. Buying
both products from the same rm thus generates one-stop shop benets, by saving the
cost of a second visit. Alternatively, the one-stop shop benet s may be interpreted as
consumption synergies stemming from purchasing both products from the same supplier.
13For the sake of exposition, we suppose that these costs are large enough to ensure that relevant prices
are all positive.
14While we focus here on independent demands for A and B, the analysis carries over when there is
partial substitution or complementarity, that is, when the utility derived from enjoying both Ai and Bh
is either lower or higher than uAi + u
B
h .
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Intuitively, consumers with high shopping costs favor one-stop shopping, whereas those
with lower shopping costs can take advantage of multi-stop shopping. Shopping patterns
are, however, endogenous and depend on rms prices. To ensure that both types of
shopping patterns arise, we will assume that the shopping cost s is su¢ ciently dispersed,
namely:
Assumption A: The shopping cost s is distributed according to a cumulative distri-
bution function F () with positive density function f () over R+.
Finally, we assume that rms compete in prices; that is, rms simultaneously set their
prices,
 
pA1 ; p
B
1

and
 
pA2 ; p
B
2

, and, having observed all prices, consumers then make their
shopping decisions. We will look for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of this game.
2.2 Competitive cross-subsidization
We rst show that, in equilibrium, multi-stop and one-stop shopping patterns coexist,
with multi-stop shoppers buying strong products and competition for one-stop shoppers
driving rmsbasket prices down to cost:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption A, in equilibrium:
(i) there are both multi-stop shoppers and one-stop shoppers;
(ii) multi-stop shoppers buy rmsstrong products, A1 and B2; and
(iii) rms sell their baskets at cost.
Proof. See Online Appendix A.
The rst two insights are intuitive. Consumers with very low shopping costs (s close to
0) are willing to visit both rms so as to combine products with better value. Conversely,
consumers with high shopping costs (s close to w, and thus such that s > ) are willing
to visit one rm at most. The last insight follows directly from rmssymmetry vis-à-vis
one-stop shoppers: as their baskets generate the same value w, Bertrand-like competition
drives their prices down to cost.
Building on Lemma 1 leads to our main insight:
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Proposition 1 Under Assumption A, in equilibrium rms sell their weak products below
cost.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is fairly simple. From Lemma 1, one-stop shoppers buy rmsbaskets
at cost, and multi-stop shoppers only buy rmsstrong products. Hence, rms either sell
both products at cost, or cross-subsidize weak products with strong ones (cross-subsidizing
strong products with weak ones would yield negative prots). Suppose now that a rm sells
both of its products at cost, and consider the following cross-subsidizationdeviation:
the rm slightly raises the price of its strong product, and reducing the price of its weak
product by the same amount. This deviation does not a¤ect the total price of the basket,
which remains o¤ered at cost to one-stop shoppers, but generates a prot from multi-stop
shoppers, who now pay a higher price for the strong product. As the deviation decreases
the value of multi-stop shopping, it may also induce some consumers to switch to one-stop
shopping; however, this does not a¤ect the rm: it was initially earning zero prot from
multi-stop shoppers, and still earns zero prot from one-stop shoppers, regardless of which
rm they go to. Hence, cross-subsidization is protable.
To go further, we introduce the following regularity condition:
Assumption B: The density function f () is continuous and the inverse hazard rate
h ()  F () =f () is strictly increasing.
The following proposition then establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions A and B, there exists a unique equilibrium, in which
both rms sell their weak products below cost and cross-subsidize them with their strong
products. More precisely, dening:
j (x)  x+ 2h (x) ; (3)
we have:
(i) consumers with a shopping cost s < s, where:
0 < s  j 1 () <  (< w) ;
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engage in multi-stop shopping (they visit both rms and buy their strong products),
whereas consumers with a shopping cost s < s < w engage in one-stop shopping
and buy both products from the same rm (either one); and
(ii) both rms o¤er their baskets at cost, but charge the same margin  = h (s) > 0 on
their strong products and the same margin   < 0 on their weak products.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The characterization of this equilibrium builds on Lemma 1. Firms only derive a prot
from selling their strong products to multi-stop shoppers, that is, those consumers with
a su¢ ciently low shopping cost, namely:
s <    1   2;
where 1  pA1   cA1 and 2  pB2   cB2 respectively denote rm 1 and 2s margins on their
strong products. Hence, rm is prot can be expressed as:
i (1; 2) = iF (   1   2) : (4)
The monotonicity of the inverse hazard rate h () ensures that the prot function i ()
is strictly quasi-concave in i. Together with the aggregative game nature of i (),
which depends on i only through the sum 1 + 2, it also ensures that the equilibrium
is unique and symmetric. Specically, both rms charge the same positive margin  on
their strong products,15 characterized by the rst-order condition:
 = h (   2) :
The equilibrium threshold for multi-stop shopping, s, satises:
s =    2 =    2h (s) ;
and is therefore given by s = j 1 (), where j 1 () is strictly increasing. Finally, in
equilibrium, each rm earns a positive prot, equal to:
 = F (s) = h (s)F (s) :
15Firms thus sell their weak products with the same negative margin   < 0. Yet, a rm would not
benet from dropping its weak product (e.g., by charging a prohibitive price): it would no longer serve
one-stop shoppers, on which it makes no loss.
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As mentioned in the Introduction, rms face a form of co-opetition: they compete for
one-stop shoppers, but o¤er complementary products to multi-stop shoppers. Indeed, the
rmsbaskets are perfect substitutes for one-stop shoppers, and erce competition for
these consumers drives basket prices down to cost. Firms make instead a prot on multi-
stop shoppers, who visit both rms in order to buy their strong products. Furthermore,
a reduction in the price of one rms strong product encourages additional consumers to
switch from one-stop to multi-stop shopping, thereby increasing the other rms prot.
As is usual with complements, the prices of strong products are subject to double mar-
ginalization problems. When contemplating an increase in the price of its strong product,
rm i balances between the positive impact on its margin i and the adverse impact on
multi-stop shopping, but ignores the negative e¤ect of this reduction in multi-stop shop-
ping activity on the other rms prot. Firms would therefore benet from a mutual
moderation of the prices charged on these products, e.g., through a bilateral price-cap
agreement.16 Interestingly, while double marginalization is usually associated with exces-
sively high price levels, here it yields excessively distorted price structures: rmstotal
prices remain at cost, but they engage in excessive cross-subsidization, compared with
what would maximize their joint prot. Keeping total margins equal to zero, rmsjoint
prot when charging a margin  on both strong products is given by:
2F (   2) ;
and is maximal for some ^ < .17
At rst glance, that shopping costs generate complementarity in rmsproducts might
not come as a surprise. Indeed, although consumers have independent demands for goods
A and B, as one might expect, one-stop shopping introduces a complementarity between
the products o¤ered within a rm: cutting the price of Ai, say, is likely to steer one-stop
shoppers towards rm i, which in turn boosts the sales of the rms other product, Bi. This
form of complementarity is not specic to our setting and is well understood. More inter-
estingly, however, multi-stop shopping introduces here a complementarity across rms,
16See Rey and Tirole (2018).
17A standard revealed preference argument yields ^F (   2^) > F (   2) > ^F (      ^),
implying ^ < .
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namely, between their strong products: cutting the price of one rms strong product in-
duces marginal consumers to switch from one-stop to multi-stop shopping, which boosts
the sales of the other rms strong product.18
2.3 Discussion
We now discuss a few robustness checks and variations of the baseline model.
 Bundling. As consumers have homogeneous valuations, there is no scope here for tying
and (pure or mixed) bundling. For instance, if one rm ties both products together phys-
ically, consumers are forced to engage in one-stop shopping, and price competition for
one-stop shoppers leads to zero prot. A similar reasoning applies to pure bundling when
products are costly, to such an extent that it does not pay to add ones favorite variety to
a bundle. In principle, a rm may also engage in mixed bundling, and o¤er three prices:
one for its strong product, one for the weak product, and one for the bundle. However, as
one-stop shoppers only purchase the bundle, and multi-stop shoppers only buy the strong
product, no consumer will ever pick the weak product on a stand-alone basis. Hence, only
two prices matter here: the total price for the bundle, and the stand-alone price for the
strong product. As these prices can be implemented using the stand-alone prices for the
two products, o¤ering a bundled discount (in addition to these stand-alone prices) cannot
generate any additional prot.
 Multiple rms. The analysis is unchanged when weak products are supplied by addi-
tional rms as well. For example, if weak products are also supplied at cost by competitive
fringe(s), and regardless of whether these fringe rms each supply one or both of these
products, then each rm i = 1; 2 would still undercut the fringe rms and o¤er its weak
product at the same below-cost price. The same applies if each rm i = 1; 2 o¤ers both
weak products as well as its strong product. For example, if rm 1 can not only o¤er A1
and B1, but also produce the weaker variety A2 in the same conditions as rm 2, then it
would still sell A1 and B2 at the same prices as before, and either not o¤er A2, or o¤er it
at unattractive prices (e.g., at cost).
18A similar complementarity for multi-stop shoppers arises when shopping patterns are driven by
heterogeneous preferences rather than transaction cost di¤erences; see Armstrong and Vickers (2010).
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 Bounded Distribution of Shopping Costs. The baseline model assumes a widespread
dispersion of consumersshopping costs, spanning the entire range from pure multi-stop
shoppers(consumers with s = 0 always choose the best value o¤ered for each product)
to pure one-stop shoppers(consumers with s   never visit a second rm). We show in
Online Appendix B.1 that, even with less dispersed distributions of shopping cost, cross-
subsidization still occurs as long as one-stop and multi-stop shopping patterns coexist:
competition for one-stop shoppers then drives total prices down to cost, but rms obtain
a prot by selling their strong products to multi-stop shoppers; hence, they sell their weak
products below cost.
 Non-linear pricing. For the sake of exposition, we focus on unit demands, and so linear
prices are e¢ cient. If instead consumers have an individual elastic demand of the form
q = d (p), where d0 (p) < 0, linear prices are no longer e¢ cient, and rms would have
an incentive to o¤er non-linear prices such as two-part tari¤s. For instance, to maximize
bilateral gains from trade, rms could use cost-based two-part tari¤s, with a constant
marginal price reecting the cost of production and a xed designed to share the resulting
surplus. Yet, the analysis carries over, applying the above analysis to the xed fees. We
show in Online Appendix B.2 that marginal prices are equal to costs, and rms o¤er their
overall baskets at cost, but rms subsidize the fees on their weak products. Interestingly,
even if tari¤s are individually e¢ cient (in that they induce consumers to buy the e¢ cient
quantity, which maximizes the bilateral gains from the transactions), the equilibrium
tari¤s still feature double marginalization: keeping total xed fees constant, those charged
on strong products exceed the level that would maximize industry prot.
 Online Retailing. To analyze the impact of online retailing, suppose that a fraction 
of internet-savvyconsumers see their shopping costs drop to zero. We show in Online
Appendix B.3 that, by modifying the distribution of shopping costs, the development of
online sales is not only protable, but moreover increases the prices of strong products:
while one-stop shoppers can still buy rmsbaskets at cost, multi-stop shoppers (including
those buying online) face higher prices as the proportion of online customers increases.
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3 Heterogeneous preferences
In the above analysis, cross-subsidization results from two key features: competition for
one-stop shoppers drives total margins down to zero, and multi-stop shoppers purchase
strong products (and only those ones); as a result, rms cross-subsidize their weak prod-
ucts, in order to make a prot from selling the strong products to multi-stop shoppers.
In practice, however, consumers may have heterogeneous preferences over rmso¤erings,
and/or may be interested only in some of the products; this may relax competition for
one-stop shoppers and may also induce some consumers to buy only the weak products.
We now show that cross-subsidization still arises, however, as long as competition for
one-stop shoppers remains su¢ ciently intense.
3.1 Horizontal di¤erentiation
Multi-product retailers such as supermarkets often o¤er di¤erentiated brands (including
their own private labels) and consumers may be quite heterogeneous in their valuations
over these products. To capture this, we now assume that rms are horizontally di¤er-
entiated, with consumerspreferences following a classic Hotelling pattern. Specically,
consumers are uniformly distributed along an Hotelling segment of unit length and in-
dexed by their location x 2 [0; 1], and rms o¤erings are located at the two ends of
the line: that is, A1 and B1 are located at 0, say, whereas A2 and B2 are located at 1.
Denoting by t the Hotelling di¤erentiation parameter, a consumer located at a distance
x from one variety of a product therefore incurs a cost tx when purchasing that variety,
and t (1  x) when purchasing the other variety. We also assume that the distribution of
shopping costs is independent of consumerslocations.
The location x can be interpreted as consumersrelative preference for the two rms:
one-stop shoppers located close to 0 (resp., 1) now favor rm 1 (resp. rm 2). Specically,
a one-stop shopper located at x obtains w   2tx   m1   s from patronizing rm 1 and
w   2t (1  x)   m2   s from going instead to rm 2, where mi denotes rm is total
margin on its basket. Thus, one-stop shoppers favor rm 1 if
x < x^  1
2
  m1  m2
4t
:
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Multi-stop shoppers still favor strong products, as in the baseline model. Thus, consumers
with x < x^ favor multi-stop shopping over patronizing rm 1 if their shopping cost satises
s < 1(x)   1   t+ 2tx;
where  1  + 1  2. Likewise, consumers located at x > x^ prefer multi-stop shopping
to patronizing rm 2 if
s < 2(x)   2 + t  2tx;
where  2   + 2   1.
Thus, the demand for the bundles A1 B1 and A2 B2 can be expressed respectively
as
D1 
Z x^
0
[1  F (1(x))] dx; D2 
Z 1
x^
[1  F (2(x))] dx:
whereas the demand for multi-stop shopping of two strong products, A1 B2, is given by
D 
Z x^
0
F (1(x))dx+
Z 1
x^
F (2(x))dx:
Then, rm 1s total prot can be written as
1 = m1D1 + 1D = m1 (D1 +D)  1D: (5)
For simplicity we assume that the distribution of the shopping cost is bounded above
by s, which is however large enough to allow for both types of shopping patters (one-stop
and multi-stop); to ensure continuity as the di¤erentiation parameter t tends to vanish,
we also assume that the density f (s) is continuously di¤erentiable. We further suppose
that the total value w is large enough to ensure full participation (all consumers buy both
products). The demand is as then illustrated in Figure 1:
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Figure 1: Heterogeneous Preferences
The heterogeneity of consumerspreferences over the two rms relaxes the intensity
of competition for one-stop shoppers; as a result, in equilibrium rms charge positive
total margins: ~m1 (t) = ~m2 (t) = ~m (t) > 0. Yet, the following Proposition shows that, as
long as this competition remains su¢ ciently intense (that is, as long as the di¤erentiation
parameter t is not too large), rms keep cross-subsidizing their products. We rst show
that this feature arises in any symmetric equilibrium with both consumption patterns; we
then provide a su¢ cient condition (namely, that the density f (s) is non-increasing) that
ensures the existence of such an equilibrium:
Proposition 3 Suppose that consumerspreferences follow the Hotelling pattern described
above, and focus on symmetric equilibria in which both consumption patterns coexist, as
depicted by Figure 1. We have:
(i) There exists t > 0 such that, in the range t 2 (0; t), rms charge a positive total
margin over their products (that is, ~m (t) > 0) but keep selling their weak products
below cost (that is, ~ (t) < 0); in addition, both ~m (t) and ~ (t) increase with t.
(ii) If the density f (s) is non-increasing, then there exists t^ > 0 such that, in the range
t 2  0; t^, there exists a unique such equilibrium.
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Proof. See Online Appendix C.1.
Proposition 3 shows that cross-subsidization can still occur when rms o¤er di¤eren-
tiated brands. However, its magnitude decreases as competition for one-stop shoppers
becomes softer. In the particular case where shopping costs are uniformly distributed, it
can further be shown that, in equilibrium, rmstotal margin increases with t and their
margin for weak products is given by
~ (t) =
3st
3s+ 2t   +
t
6
  
3
;
which also increases with t and is null for some t > 0;19 hence, cross-subsidization arises
for t < t, and disappears for t > t: as competition for one-stop shoppers becomes less
and less intense, rms charge them higher total margins, up to the point where they
can charge high enough margins on their strong products, to exploit multi-stop shoppers,
without selling their weak products below cost.
3.2 Stand-alone demands
Other sources of consumer heterogeneity could further a¤ect the analysis. For instance,
some consumers may be interested in only one of the products rather than in the whole
assortment, and among these some may prefer the strong product of a rm but others
may prefer its weak product. More generally, even when most consumers prefer one
rms variety of a good over the rivals variety, some consumers may nevertheless have a
strong preference for the latter. Intuitively, rms will further engage in cross-subsidization
when more consumers are interested in their strongproducts, and will instead reduce
the level of cross-subsidization when more consumers are specically interested in their
weakproducts. Suppose for example that, in addition to the multi-product consumers
with demand as described in the previous section, a small mass  of consumers are only
interested in the strong products, A1 and B2, and a mass ! of consumers are interested
only in the weak products, A2 and B1. Firm is prot is then given by:
i = miDi + iD + i + !i
= mi (Di +D + )  i (D +    !) :
19Equilibrium existence is moreover guaranteed in that range (i.e., t < t^) if shopping costs are su¢ -
ciently dispersed, e.g., s > 7=2; see Online Appendix C.1.
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As
@2i
@@i
< 0 <
@2i
@!@i
;
a revealed preference argument shows that, other things being equal, an increase in the
mass  of customers interested in its strong product gives the rm an incentive to sell
its weak product further below cost (i.e., to decrease the margin i), whereas an increase
in the mass ! of customers specically interested in its weak product discourages cross-
subsidization.
To further explore this, we focus below on the case where  = 0 and the shopping
cost s is uniformly distributed on [0; s]; also, to limit rmsmarket power on the weak
products, A2 and B1, we assume that they are also o¤ered at cost by a competitive fringe
hence, the presence of consumers only interested in these products may limit the scope
for cross-subsidization, but does not confer additional market power to the rms. We
have:
Proposition 4 Suppose that a unit-mass of consumers have preferences following the
Hotelling pattern previously described, with shopping costs uniformly distributed between
0 and s, and that, in addition, for each rm there is a small mass ! of consumers only
interested in its weak product. There exists t^ > 0, !^ > 0 and  (!) satisfying  (0) = 0
and  0 (!) > 0, such that there exists a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies for any
(!; t) 2 [0; !^]   (!) ; t^. Furthermore, there exists  (!), satisfying 0 (!) < 0 and
t^ >  (!) >  (!^) in the range ! 2 [0; !^], such that, in this symmetric equilibrium, rms
cross-subsidize their weak products whenever  (!) > t >  (!).
Proof. See Online Appendix C.2.
These ndings are illustrated in Figure 2. It can be checked that, as expected, the
equilibrium margins ~m (!; t) and ~ (!; t) increase with t: product di¤erentiation softens
competition for one-stop shoppers, which reduces the scope for cross-subsidization; the
limit case t =  (!) corresponds to ~ (!;  (!)) = 0, where rms stop cross-subsidizing
their products. Firmsprots also increase with product di¤erentiation, thanks to reduced
competition.
In addition, ~m (!; t) and ~ (!; t) also increase with !: single-product consumersde-
mand for the weak products reduces the scope of cross-subsidization, which softens com-
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petition for one-stop shoppers as well; as ~ (!; t) increases in both t and !, it follows
that  (!) decreases in !. Firmsprots may however decrease as the demand for weak
products increases, as the loss from serving these single-product consumers may more
than o¤set the gain due to reduced competition.
Firms incur a loss from selling at below-cost prices their weak products (and only those)
to single-product consumers; they would therefore be tempted to drop these products if
this loss were to exceed the gain from serving one-stop shoppers. This happens when !
is su¢ ciently large compared with t, namely, when t <  (!).
Figure 2: Stand-alone demand
for weak products
4 Product choice
The above analysis relies on the assumption that rms have comparative advantages over
di¤erent products. We now endogenize rms product choices and show that, indeed,
rmshave an incentive to improve their positions on di¤erent products. We rst extend
the baseline setting by considering arbitrarily given positions in the two markets (Section
4.1). We then endogenize rmsproduct choice decisions (Section 4.2).
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4.1 Asymmetric comparative advantage
We have so far assumed that each rm enjoyed a comparative advantage in one market,
and that their advantages were moreover of the same magnitude. We now extend the
analysis to arbitrary positions of the rms.
Intuitively, when one rm benets from a comparative advantage in both markets,
then the other rm will not attract any consumer; hence, there is no multi-stop shopping,
and cross-subsidization becomes a moot issue. The following proposition conrms this
intuition and shows that, by contrast, multi-stop shopping and cross-subsidization keep
arising as long as each rm enjoys a comparative advantage in one market.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that rm 1 benets from a comparative advan-
tage 1 > 0 in market A, which exceeds rm 2s comparative advantage 2 in market B:
1 > 2; note that we allow for 2 < 0, in which case rm 1 actually enjoys a comparative
advantage in both markets.
In the absence of rm 2, rm 1 would sell both of its products as long as its individual
margins do not exceed consumersvaluations; by charging m1, it would attract all con-
sumers with a shopping cost lower than v1 = w1 m1, where w1 denotes the total surplus
generated by rm 1s basket. Hence, it would choose the monopolymargin
mM1  arg max
m1
fm1F (w1  m1)g ;
which is uniquely dened under Assumptions A and B. We have:
Proposition 5 Suppose that rm 1 enjoys a weakly larger comparative advantage: 1 
max f2; 0g; under Assumptions A and B, there exists a unique trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium, in which:
(i) Firm 2 sells its basket at cost but rm 1 attracts all one-stop shoppers and charges
them a total margin m1 reecting its overall comparative advantage over the two
products:
m1 = min

mM1 ; 1   2
	
:
(ii) If rm 2 does not enjoy a comparative advantage in the other market (i.e., 2  0),
then it attracts no consumer; hence, there is no multi-stop shopping, and cross-
subsidization need not arise.
20
(iii) If instead rm 2 enjoys a comparative advantage in the other market (i.e., 0 < 2 <
1), then consumers with a shopping cost
s < s  j 1 (2) ;
where j () is dened by (3), engage in multi-stop shopping (they visit both rms and
buy their strong products), and cross-subsidization arises: both rms sell their weak
products below costs, with the same negative margin equal to  h (s) < 0.
Proof. See Online Appendix D.1.
The outcome of competition for one-stop shoppers is intuitive: rm 1s basket o¤ering
a greater surplus, it wins the competition for one-stop shoppers and can charge them a
total margin as high as its relative comparative advantage, 1   2; it does so when rm
2 exerts a competitive pressure (i.e., 1   2 < mM1 ), otherwise it charges the monopoly
margin mM1 .
That rm 2 keeps subsidizing its weak product is not surprising: as its overall basket
is less attractive, competition for one-stop shoppers leads rm 2 to o¤er its basket at cost;
as it enjoys market power over multi-stop shoppers, however, it charges a positive margin
on its strong product, and must therefore sell the weak product below cost. To understand
why rm 1 still subsidizes its weak product even though it now enjoys market power over
one-stop shoppers as well, consider again the following thought experiment. Increase rm
1s margin on its strong product by a small amount and decrease the margin on its weak
product by the same amount, so as to maintain the total marginm1. This alteration of the
price structure does not a¤ect the prot made on one-stop shoppers (who pay the same
total price for the basket) but increases the prot made on multi-stop shoppers (who pay
a higher price for the strong product). In addition, this induces some marginal multi-stop
shoppers to switch to one-stop shopping and buy rm 1s weak product as well (instead
of buying only its strong product). It is therefore protable for rm 1 to keep altering the
price structure as long as it earns a non-negative margin on its weak product; hence, in
equilibrium it sells its weak product below cost.
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4.2 Endogenous comparative advantage
Our baseline model assumes that rms have comparative advantages over di¤erent prod-
ucts. We show now such asymmetric comparative advantages arise endogenously when
rms can invest in cost reduction or quality improvement. For the sake of exposition,
we suppose that rms initially provide the same value for each product, and add a pre-
liminary stage in which they can improve the value of their products. For tractability,
we rst focus on a simple setting in which rms can allocate a value-improvementen-
dowment  among the products A and B; that is, each rm can enhance the value of it
products, subject to the constraint that the overall improvement cannot exceed . For
instance, rms may have to prioritize the projects of their R&D units so as to target
quality-improving and/or cost-reducing innovations across their products. Supermarkets
face similar choices for their private labels; in addition, they employ buying agents to
negotiate with suppliers, and may concentrate their bargaining e¤orts so as to obtain
better deals on specic products. At the end of this section, we discuss how the insights
obtained in this simple setting extend to more general investment environments in which
rms choose as well their improvement capability .
We thus consider the following extended game:
 Stage 1: each rm i = 1; 2 chooses (Ai ;Bi) 2 S 

(A;B) 2 R2+ j A + B  
	
;
these decisions are simultaneous.
 Stage 2: rms simultaneously set the prices for their products.
Firmspricing decisions will obviously be driven in part by their own improvement
decisions. Whether a rms pricing decisions can also be contingent on the other rms im-
provement decisions depends on the observability of these decisions. For example, quality
improvements are more likely to be observed than cost reductions or lower input tari¤s.
We will consider here both extreme situations, in which improvement decisions are either
publicly observed, or remain private, at the end of the rst stage. We assume however
that consumers observe these decisions before making their purchasing decisions. This is
consistent with the quality/cost dichotomy highlighted above: this amounts to assume
that consumers can observe the quality of the products o¤ered; in case of reductions in
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costs or wholesale prices, the assumption is innocuous as consumerspurchasing decisions
do not depend on them.
We look for the subgame trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria of this two-stage
game. The following Proposition shows that rms have an incentive to invest in di¤erent
products, which in turn gives rise to cross-subsidization:
Proposition 6 In the above two-stage game, and regardless of whether improvement de-
cisions are public or private at the end of the rst stage, there exists exactly two subgame
trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, in which: (i) in stage 1, rms
enhance by  the value of their o¤erings in di¤erent markets; (ii) in stage 2, they sell
their baskets at costs but, thanks to cross-subsidization, obtain a positive prot by charging
 = h (s) > 0 on their strong products, where s = j 1 ().
In addition:
(i) if improvement decisions remain private at the end of the rst stage, then there
exists a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which rms invest  and charge
 on either product with equal probability; and
(ii) if improvement decisions are publicly observed at the end of the rst stage, then when
h () is weakly concave there is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which rms
invest  on either product with equal probability.
Proof. See Online Appendix D.2.
To capture this intuition in its easiest form, consider a simple discrete-choice variant
of the above game in which each rm must simply choose which product to target (that
is, (Ai ;Bi) 2 f(; 0) ; (0;)g). If both rms invest in the same market, then their
o¤erings are not di¤erentiated and head-to-head competition leads to zero prot for each
rm. If instead they invest in di¤erent products, then they sell their baskets at cost but
obtain a positive prot equal to  = F (s)h (s), where s = j 1 (). Hence, there are
two pure-strategy equilibria, in which rm 1 invest in one product whereas rm 2 invests
in the other product. Whether rms observe each others improvement decisions at the
end of the rst stage does not a¤ect these equilibria: if a rm expects its rival to invest
entirely on a single product, and to o¤er its basket at cost (implying that serving one-stop
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shoppers cannot bring any benet), it has an incentive to invest on the other product, in
order to maximize the value o¤ered to multi-shop shoppers and exploit their demand. The
above proposition shows that the argument extends to continuous allocation decisions.
Interestingly, there also exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which rms invests in
either product with equal probability. Half of the time, they then end-up with similar
o¤erings, in which case all products are supplied at cost. However, the rest of the time
each rm ends-up with a strong and a weak product, and cross-subsidizes its weak product
with the strong one. It follows that prices are also stochastic, and consistent with each
rms o¤ering random discounts or special o¤ers on one product (either one). Consider,
for example, the case of supermarkets negotiating a discount  o¤ the regular input costs,
cA or cB. Half of the time, every product i = A;B is sold below the non-discounted cost
ci by one rm (at price ci ), and above the discounted cost ci  by the other rm (at
price ci   + ); this induces multi-stop shoppers to mix-and-match in order to benet
from the lower price, c  + , on both products.20
As mentioned above, we have also considered more general investment environments in
which each rm i = 1; 2 can choose any improvements Ai  0 and Bi  0, at total cost
C (Ai + Bi) see Online Appendix D.3. Under mild regularity conditions ensuring the
existence of an equilibrium in which both rms invest (and, for tractability, ensuring that
the market is fully covered), the unique subgame (trembling-hand) perfect Nash equilibria
in pure strategies are such that rms choose to invest in di¤erent products, which leads
them to sell again their weaker products below cost. Interestingly, however, it is always
the case that one rm invests more than the other, in order to obtain market power over
one-stop shoppers as well.
20The rest of the time, rmsprices coincide for each product, and multi-stop shopping thus does not
arise all prices are at cost in case of public decisions, whereas cross-subsidization still arises in case of
private decisions; in both cases, however, rms obtain the same expected prot, equal to  () =2.
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5 Resale-below-cost laws
In regulated industries, cross-subsidization has been a well-recognized issue in both the-
ory and practice,21 and has prompted regulators to impose structural or behavioral reme-
dies.22 In contrast, in competitive markets, the policy debate is more divided. Although
below-cost pricing might be treated as predatory,23 in many cases (including the Apple
vs. Amazon example) there is no such thing as a predatory phase followed by a re-
coupment phase(e.g., once rivals have been driven out of the market), which constitute
key features of predation scenarios.24 As mentioned in the Introduction, this has led
many countries to adopt specic rules prohibiting or limiting below-cost pricing in retail
markets. These rules, known as Resale-Below-Cost (RBC hereafter) laws, have been the
subject of heated policy debates. In Ireland, for example, based on evidence that con-
sumers pay more when grocery goods are subject to the prohibition of below-cost sales,
in 2005 the Irish Competition Authority recommended terminating the RBC law.25 How-
ever, the Irish Joint Committee on Enterprise and Small Business recommended keeping
the RBC law due to concerns about an increased concentration in grocery retailing and
predatory pricing. The Irish example highlights the dilemma of antitrust authorities:
21The seminal paper of Faulhaber (1975) rigorously denes the concept of cross-subsidy and intro-
duces two tests for subsidy-free pricing, which have been widely applied in both regulation and antitrust
enforcement. See Faulhaber (2005) for a recent survey.
22Such concerns led, for instance, to the break-up of AT&T and the imposition of lines of business
restrictions on local telephone companies (U.S. v. AT&T 1982). More recently, the European Commission
required the German postal operator to stop cross-subsidizing its parcel services with the prot derived
from its legal monopoly on letter services (Deutsche Post 2001).
23See, for example, Bolton, Brodley and Riordan (2000) and Eckert and West (2003) for detailed
discussions of how predatory pricing tests should be designed. Rao and Klein (1992) and Berg and
Weisman (1992) examine the treatment of cross-subsidization under US antitrust laws.
24In the US, for instance, the feasibility of recoupment is necessary for a predation case since the
Supreme Court decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
25The Irish Competition Authority examined pricing trends under the Groceries Order (the RBC law
introduced in Ireland in 1987). The authority found that prices for grocery items covered by the Order
had been increasing, while prices for grocery items not covered by the Order had been decreasing; it
concluded that, on average, Irish families were paying 500 euros more per year because of the Order. See
OECD (2007).
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RBC laws may prevent dominant retailers from engaging in predatory pricing against
smaller or more fragile rivals, but in competitive markets they may also lead to higher
prices and thus harm consumers.
We now examine the impact of a ban on below-cost pricing in our baseline setting.
We rst note that such a ban raises equilibrium basket prices, which benets rms at the
expense of one-stop shoppers:
Proposition 7 When below-cost pricing is prohibited, in equilibrium each rm obtains a
prot at least equal to:
  max

F (   ) > 2:
It follows that, compared to the equilibrium that arises in the absence of a ban under
Assumptions A and B:
(i) rms more than double their prots; and
(ii) one-stop shoppers face higher prices for the rmsbaskets.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition is simple. If the rival o¤ers both of its products at cost, a rm cannot
make a prot on one-stop shoppers, but can still make a prot by selling its strong
product to multi-stop shoppers. Indeed, charging a margin  <  induces consumers with
shopping cost s <    to buy both strong products, thus generating a prot F (   ).
By choosing the optimal margin:
  arg max

F (   ) ; (6)
the rm can thus secure . Hence, in any equilibrium, each rm earns a prot at least
equal to . Furthermore, as the rival can no longer subsidize its weak product, each rm
now more than doubles its prot:  = max F (   ) > 2F (   2) = 2. Finally,
equilibrium total margins are positive, as weak products cannot be sold below cost, and
strong products are sold with a positive margin. One-stop shoppers thus face higher prices
than in the absence of the ban.
Intuitively, banning below-cost pricing should lead the rms to o¤er their weak prod-
ucts at cost. Furthermore, as a rm can obtain at least  by charging  to multi-stop
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shoppers, it will never charge so low a margin that it would obtain less than , even if it
were to attract all shoppers. That is, no rm will ever charge  < , where  is the lower
solution to:
F
 
w    = : (7)
The next proposition shows that, while there is no pure-strategy equilibrium when
below-cost pricing is banned, there exists an equilibrium in which rms indeed sell their
weak products at cost, and obtain an expected prot equal to  by randomizing the
margins on their strong products between  and :
Proposition 8 If s is distributed with positive density over R+ (Assumption A) or over
[0; s] with s > w, then when below-cost pricing is prohibited:
(i) there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies; and
(ii) there exists a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which rms obtain an expected
prot equal to  by selling weak products at cost and randomizing the margins on
strong products over

; 

.
Proof. See Online Appendix E.1.
As in the sales model of Varian (1980), rms face a dilemma: they are tempted to
exploit captive customers (the uninformed consumers in Varians model, and multi-
stop shoppers here) but, at the same time, they want to compete for price-sensitive
customers (the informed consumers in Varians model, and one-stop shoppers here). To
see why there is no pure-strategy equilibrium, note that competition for one-stop shoppers
would again drive total basket prices down to cost. But as below-cost pricing is banned,
this would require selling both products at cost. Obviously, this cannot be an equilibrium,
as a rm can make a prot on multi-stop shoppers by charging a small positive margin
on its strong product.
The characterization of the mixed-strategy equilibrium is similar to that proposed
by Varian (1980) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1992).26 In this equilibrium, ex
26Using the analysis of the latter paper, it can moreover be shown that, conditional on pricing weak
products at cost, the (mixed-strategy) equilibrium (for the price of strong products) is unique.
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post, consumers with a shopping cost below  b (1; 2)   max f1; 2g favor multi-stop
shopping and buy both rmsstrong products, whereas consumers with a shopping cost
in the range  b (1; 2) < s < v
b (1; 2)  w min f1; 2g are one-stop shoppers and buy
from the rm that charges the lowest price for its basket.
Let us now examine the impact of a ban on consumers. We rst note that marginal
consumers are one-stop shoppers, as vb >  b. As banning below-cost pricing raises prices
for one-stop shoppers, it follows that this reduces not only the number of one-stop shop-
pers, but also the total number of consumers from F (w) to F
 
vb (1; 2)

. Furthermore,
the multi-stop shopping cost threshold  b satises:
 b (1; 2)     b (; ) =     > s:
Hence, banning below-cost pricing fosters multi-stop shopping.
This does not mean that multi-stop shoppers face lower prices, however. In particular,
the upper bound  exceeds the margin  that arises in the absence of the ban,27 implying
that multi-stop shoppers face higher prices with at least some probability. The next
proposition shows that banning below-cost pricing actually harms multi-stop shoppers,
as well as one-stop shoppers, when weak products o¤er relatively little value, that is,
when w is close to :
Proposition 9 Suppose that s is distributed with positive density over R+ (Assumption
A) or over [0; s] with s > w. Keeping  constant, for w close enough to :
(i) every consumers expected surplus is lower in the equilibrium characterized by Propo-
sition 8 than in the equilibrium that arises in the absence of a ban; and
(ii) total welfare can however be lower or higher, depending on the distribution of shop-
ping costs. For instance, if F (s) = (s=s)k, then there exists k^ (w; ) > 0 such that
banning below-cost pricing decreases (resp., increases) total welfare if k < k^ (w; )
(resp., k > k^ (w; )).
27To see this, it su¢ ces to note that, from the rst-order conditions,  and  satisfy respectively,
 = h (      ) and  = h (   ), where h (:) is an increasing function.
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Proof. See Online Appendix E.2.
The intuition is that, when weak products are veryweak, there are relatively few
one-stop shoppers. Firms can then raise the prices of their strong products, so as to exploit
multi-stop shoppers, without being too concerned about losing one-stop shoppers. Indeed,
in the limit case where w = , the lower bound  of the equilibrium margin distribution
converges to the upper bound  (> ), and thus multi-stop shoppers certainly face higher
prices. By continuity, multi-stop shoppers face higher expected prices, as long as weak
products are not too valuable. However, as a ban on below-cost pricing increases rms
prots, the impact on total welfare remains ambiguous, and depends, in particular, on
the distribution of shopping costs.
Thus, in competitive markets, RBC laws increase rms prots but hurt one-stop
shoppers. When weak products o¤er relatively low value, multi-stop shoppers face higher
prices as well, in which case banning below-cost pricing increases rmsprots at the
expense of consumers. This nding gives support to the conclusion of the OECD (2007)
report, which argues that RBC laws are likely to lead to higher prices and thus harm
consumers. The reduction in consumer surplus may, moreover, exceed the increase in
rmsprots and thus result in lower total welfare. However, when, instead, weak products
o¤er high value, RBC laws may have a positive impact on multi-stop shoppers.28
Remark: Upstream margins. In the case of downstream rms (e.g., retailers), their
comparative advantages may be mainly driven by di¤erences in wholesale prices rather
than in quality or cost. For instance, in the setting developed in Section 4, supermarkets
may devote resources to negotiating better conditions from their suppliers, and have an
incentive to target di¤erent products. Total welfare must also account for the prot of
upstream suppliers, which may a¤ect the social impact of RBC laws. For example, in
the Online Appendix E.2 we consider a variant along these lines, in which rms initially
face the same wholesale price for each product, and negotiate a discount  on one or
the other product; strong productsthen correspond to those on which they negotiated
the discount, and weak products correspond to those on which they pay the regular
wholesale price. To x ideas, suppose moreover strong products are supplied at cost (that
28However, RBC laws reduce total expected consumer surplus when, for instance, the density of the
distribution of shopping costs does not increase between s and ; see Online Appendix B.3.
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is, the discount corresponds to the suppliers entire margin), so that the suppliersprot
comes only from the sales of weakproducts. As RBC laws reduce the extent of one-
stop shopping, and one-stop shoppers are the only ones buying the weak products, on
which the rms are paying the regular wholesale price, so does the prot of the upstream
suppliers. It follows that banning below-cost pricing hurts upstream suppliers as well,
which further degrades the impact on total welfare.
In a setting where consumers are one-stop shoppers who underestimate (some of)
their needs, Johnson (2016) nds that banning below-cost pricing has an unambiguously
negative impact: it increases the price for potential loss leaders (those products for which
consumers do not underestimate their needs) and harms consumers, despite decreasing
the prices for the other products. In our setting, a ban on below-cost pricing also raises
the price of potential loss leaders (namely, the weak products), but can either increase
or decrease the (expected) price of the other products (the strong ones). Also, while
one-stop shoppers are worse-o¤ under RBC laws, as in Johnsons paper, we allow for
multi-stop shoppers as well, and they can either be worse- or better-o¤. In spite of these
discrepancies, Johnsons paper and this paper both call for the cautious use of below-cost
pricing regulations in competitive markets; and where they are implemented, their impact
should be carefully evaluated.
6 Conclusion
We have studied competition between multi-product rms in a setting where rms enjoy
comparative advantages over di¤erent goods or services, and customers have heteroge-
neous transaction costs. As a result, those with low costs tend to patronize multiple
suppliers, whereas those with higher shopping costs are more prone to one-stop shopping.
This gives rise to a form of co-opetition, as rmsbaskets are substitutes for one-stop
shoppers, but their strong products are complements for multi-stop shoppers. As a re-
sult, competition for one-stop shoppers drives total basket prices down to total cost but, in
order to exploit their market power over multi-stop shoppers, rms price strong products
above cost and weak products below cost. Furthermore, the complementarity of rms
strong products generates double marginalization problems, which here take the form of
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excessive cross-subsidization: indeed, rms would benet from mutual moderation, for
example, by agreeing to put a cap on the prices of strong products. Such bilateral agree-
ments would benet consumers (competition for one-stop shoppers would still induce rms
to o¤er them their baskets at cost remain, but multi-stop shoppers would benet from
lower prices), and would also increase prots by boosting multi-stop shopping.
These insights highlight the role of the interaction across products in rmsown o¤er-
ings, and of the diversity in consumersshopping patterns, for the analysis of competition
among multi-product rms. Interestingly, until recently the empirical literature on plat-
form competition in media or healthcare industries, or on retail competition between
supermarkets, have instead tended to either ignore multi-stop shopping, or focus on a
specic product category. The recent work by Thomassen et al. (2017), who account for
the multiplicity of product categories and the heterogeneity of shopping patters, consti-
tutes a notable exception, and its ndings conrms the importance of these features.
These insights can also shed some light on rms incentives to invest in improving
their o¤erings or to negotiate better conditions from their suppliers. When endogenizing
product choices, we found that rms have indeed incentives to di¤erentiate themselves by
targeting di¤erent products.
The legal treatment of cross-subsidization in competitive markets has triggered much
debate. We nd that banning below-cost pricing substantially benets rms their prots
more than double  at the expense of one-stop shoppers, and it can also reduce total
consumer surplus and social welfare, depending on the value o¤ered by weak products
and the distribution of shopping patterns. Our analysis thus calls for a cautious use of
resale-below-cost laws in competitive markets.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Thanks to Lemma 1, the equilibrium characterization is fairly simple. As rms sell their
baskets at cost, one-stop shopping gives consumers the fullvalue w. Consumers may,
however, prefer buying both strong products, A1 from rm 1 and B2 from rm 2; this
involves an extra shopping cost s and yields a total value:
v12  uA1   pA1 + uB2   pB2 = w +    1   2;
where 1  pA1   cA1 and 2  pB2   cB2 respectively denote rm 1 and 2s margins on
their strong products. Consumers favor multi-stop shopping over one-stop shopping if the
additional value from mixing-and-matching exceeds the extra shopping cost, that is, if
s    v12   w =    1   2:
Hence, consumers with a shopping cost s <  engage in multi-stop shopping, whereas
those with a shopping cost such that  < s < w opt for one-stop shopping (and those
with a shopping cost s > w do not shop at all). As rms only derive a prot from selling
their strong products to multi-stop shoppers, rm is prot can be expressed as:
i (1; 2) = iF () = iF (   1   2) : (4)
Furthermore, we know from Lemma 1 that there are some multi-stop shoppers are active
in equilibrium; hence, the margins 1 and 2 must satisfy 1 + 2 < . If follows that
these margins cannot be negative: any rm i o¤ering that i < 0 would make a loss,
which it could avoid by charging instead a non-negative margin. Likewise, starting from
a candidate equilibrium in which some rm i charges i = 0, that rm could protably
deviate by slightly raising its margin:
@i
@i
(1; 2)

i=0
= F () > 0:
Hence, in equilibrium, each rm i must charge a positive margin on its strong product:
i > 0. As the basket is o¤ered at cost, this implies that rm i sells its weak product
below cost.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Thanks to Lemma 1, the equilibrium is interior, and consumers whose shopping cost lies
below  =  1 2 patronize both rms, whereas those whose shopping cost lies between
 and w patronize a single rm. As noted in the text, the monotonicity of the inverse
hazard rate h () ensures that the prot function i (1; 2) is strictly quasi-concave in i,
and its aggregative game nature ensures that any candidate equilibrium is symmetric:
1 = 2 = , which satises the rst-order solution  = h (   2). The monotonicity
of h () further ensures that this rst-order condition characterizes a unique candidate
equilibrium, such that:
 = h ( ) ;
where:
  = j 1 () :
Note that, by construction,   > 0 (as j (0) = 0 < ) and thus: (i)  = h ( ) > 0; and:
(ii)  < =2 (as    2 =   > 0).
There is thus a unique candidate equilibrium, in which both rms charge  on their
strong products and a negative margin  =   on their weak products. We now show
that rms cannot benet from any deviation. Suppose, for example, that rm i deviates
by charging i on its strong product and i on its weak product. Obviously, it cannot make
a prot from one-stop shoppers, as it would have to sell its basket (weakly) below cost to
attract them. Furthermore, it cannot make a prot either by o¤ering its weak product to
multi-stop shoppers, as it would have to charge i      < 0 to attract them. Thus,
it can only make a prot from selling its strong product to multi-stop shoppers, and this
prot is equal to iF (), where  = minf +    i;  + i   g; but then:
iF ()  iF ( +    i) = iF (      i)  ;
where the inequality comes from the fact that the prot function iF (      i) is
quasi-concave in i, from the monotonicity of h (), and, by construction, maximal for
i = 
.
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C Proof of Proposition 7
We now derive the minmax prot that each rm can earn when below-cost pricing is not
allowed. Consider rst rm is response when rm j sets both of its margins to zero, that
is, j = j = 0. Firm i cannot make a prot from one-stop shoppers who can obtain
both products at cost from rm j, and thus it can only make a prot by selling its strong
product to multi-stop shoppers. The threshold for multi-stop shopping is  =    i, and
thus the prot from multi-stop shoppers is given by iF (   i). Choosing i so as to
maximize this prot gives rm i:
  max

F (   ) > 0;
where the inequality stems from  > 0. The associated margin is given by:
 2 arg max

F (   ) :
Note that this margin satises  < ( ) wi for i 2 f1; 2g. [In case there are multiple
solutions, then any solution satises this property and those that follow below.]
To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to note that, in response to any rivals margins
j  0 and j  0, rm i can always secure at least  by charging i  wi and i =
. Choosing i  wi ensures that any multi-stop shoppers will buy both rmsstrong
products.
Additionally, if vj  vi, then the threshold for multi-stop shopping is given by:
 = v12   vj
and thus satises:
 = w +      ^j  
 
w   ^j   ^j

=  + ^j   
    ;
where the inequality stems from ^j = min

j; wj
	  0. It follows that rm i obtains at
least :
i = iF () = F ()  F (   ) = :
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If instead vj < vi, then rm i sells its strong product to both one-stop and multi-stop
shoppers, and thus again obtains at least :
i = iF

max
n
vi;
v12
2
o
 iF (vi) = F ( wi   )  F (   ) = ;
where the second inequality stems from wi > .
It follows that, in any candidate equilibrium, rms must obtain a positive prot i  ,
and thus charge a positive total margin mi > 0 (as mi = 0 would imply i = i = 0, and
thus i = 0).
Finally, we show that  = F (   ) > 2 = 2F (   2). The strict inequality
follows from 2 > , or  =     >   (note that   + 2 =  =  + ). To see this,
note that  =     =    h (), which amounts to  = l (), where l ()   + h ()
< j() =  + 2h (), and this implies  = l 1 () > j 1 () =  . Q.E.D.
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Notation. Throughout the exposition:
 We refer to the two rms as rms i and j, with the convention that i 6= j 2 f1; 2g.
 For each rm i 2 f1; 2g, we denote the social value generated by its strong (resp.,
weak) product by wi (resp., by wi), and denote the margin charged on its strong
(resp., weak) product by i (resp., by i). By assumption, we have wi; wi > 0 and:
wi + wi = w;
wi   wj = :
 The value o¤ered by rm i is thus equal to:
vi  max fwi   i; 0g+ max f wi   i; 0g ;
whereas multi-stop shoppers obtain
v12 = max f w1   1; 0g+ max f w2   2; 0g
if they buy both strong products, and obtain instead
v12 = max fw1   1; 0g+ max fw2   2; 0g
if they buy both weak products.
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 Using the adjustedmargins, dened as:
^i  min fi; wig and ^i  min fi; wig ;
these values can be respectively expressed as:
vi = wi   ^i + wi   ^i = w   ^i   ^i;
v12 = w1   ^1 + w2   ^2 = w +    ^1   ^2;
v12 = w1   ^1 + w2   ^2 = w      ^1   ^2:
Multi-stop shoppers would not buy strong products unless i  wi for i = 1; 2 (the
value from multi-stop shopping, even gross of shopping costs, would otherwise be lower
than from one-stop shopping), implying ^i = i and
v12 = w +    1   2:
Likewise, multi-stop shoppers would not buy both weak products unless i  wi for
i = 1; 2, implying that:
v12 = w      1   2:
Moreover, for a rm that attracts one-stop shoppers, it is never optimal to charge a
margin that exceeds the social value of the product, that is, i > wi and i > wi cannot
arise in equilibrium where rm i serves some one-stop shoppers. Suppose rm i charges
i > wi and i  wi, and one-stop shoppers only buy its strong product. Reducing i
such that ~i = wi  " > 0 increases rm is prot by also selling its weak product to one-
stop shoppers and by attracting more one-stop shoppers as ~vi > vi. Doing so may also
transform some multi-stop shoppers (if indeed there are any multi-stop shoppers buying
strong products) into one-stop shoppers, as now ~ =  + ~i   j <  , on which rm i
earns a higher prot. Similarly, charging i > wi is never optimal if rm i attracts some
one-stop shoppers. Therefore, without loss of generality we focus on i  wi and i  wi
if one-stop shoppers patronize rm i.
The shopping cost thresholds, below which consumers favor picking both strong prod-
ucts rather than patronizing only rm 1 or rm 2, are respectively  1 = v12 v1 = +1 2
and  2 = v12   v2 =    1 + 2. Likewise, the thresholds for picking weak products are
2
 1  v12   v1 = 1   2    and  2  v12   v2 = 2   1   . Let   minf 1;  2g
and   minf 1;  2g. Note that  1 =   2,  2 =   1, and thus  =   . Therefore, in
equilibrium, it cannot be the case that some multi-stop shoppers buy strong products,
and other buy weak products.
A Proof of Lemma 1
To prove the lemma, we rst establish the following claims.
Claim 1 Some consumers are active in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there is no active consumer. It must be the case thatmaxfv1; v2; v12; v12g 
0, and rms make no prot. Consider the following deviation for rm 1: charge ~1 > 0
and ~1 > 0 such that ~m1 = ~1 + ~1 = w   ", for some " 2 (0; w). Firm 1 then attracts
consumers with shopping cost s  ~v1 = " and earns a positive prot, a contradiction.
Thus, some consumers must be active in equilibrium.
Claim 2 If there are active one-stop shoppers in equilibrium, then m1 = m2 = 0.
Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which some one-stop shoppers are active,
which requires max fv1; v2g > 0. If mi < mj, then rm i attracts all one-stop shoppers;
therefore:
 if mi  0 and rm i makes no prot on multi-stop shoppers (either because there
is no multi-stop shopper, or rm i o¤ers them a negative margin), then it would
benet from charging slightly positive margins on both products: this would avoid
any loss (if mi < 0) and/or generate a small prot (if mi = 0, implying mj > 0);
 if instead mi  0 but rm i makes a prot on multi-stop shoppers, then it would
benet from raising its margin on the product not purchased by them, so as to
charge a slightly positive total margin: this would avoid the loss and/or generate
a prot from one-stop shoppers, and would moreover increase the demand from
multi-stop shoppers, as it would reduce the value from one-stop shopping without
a¤ecting that of multi-stop shopping;
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 nally, if mi > 0, then rm j would benet from o¤ering a total margin slightly
below mi, by reducing as needed its margin on the product not purchased by multi-
stop shoppers: rm j would then attract one-stop shoppers and make a positive
prot on them, without substantially a¤ecting the prot obtained from multi-stop
shoppers, if any.
We thus have m1 = m2 = m, implying that rms share the demand from one-stop
shoppers; let rm i be a rm attracting at least half of them. If m < 0, then rm i would
benet from slightly increasing its margin on the product not purchased by multi-stop
shoppers: this would avoid the loss made on one-stop shoppers (who then all go to rm j)
without substantially a¤ecting any prot obtained from multi-stop shoppers. If instead
m > 0, then rm j would benet from slightly decreasing its margin on the product
not purchased by multi-stop shoppers: this would attract all one-stop shoppers, without
substantially a¤ecting any prot from multi-stop shoppers. Hence, m = 0.
Claim 3 In equilibrium, active multi-stop shoppers buy the strong products.
Proof. Suppose that some multi-stop shoppers buy the weak products. Each rm
must then o¤er better value on its weak product than the rivals strong product; that
is, each rm must sell its strong product with a margin that exceeds its rivals quality-
adjustedmargin: 2  1 + and 1  2 +. We show that such a conguration cannot
be an equilibrium. We consider two cases:
 suppose rst that there are only multi-stop shoppers (buying the weak products). To
make a prot, rms must charge non-negative margins on their weak products, that
is, 1, 2  0. From the above, this implies that each rm sells its strong product
with a margin that exceeds its comparative advantage : 2   and 1  . But
then, any rm could make a prot by reducing the margin on its strong product.
For instance, keeping 1 unchanged, by charging ~1 = 2 +    " > 0, rm 1 would
also sell its strong product to all previously active consumers, as it now o¤ers better
value on A: ~vA1 = v
A
2 + ". The deviation may also attract additional one-stop
shoppers from which the rm makes a prot as ~1 > 0 and 1  0; and
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 suppose, instead, that there are both one-stop shoppers and multi-stop shoppers.
From Claim 2, price competition for one-stop shoppers then leads to m1 = m2 = 0.
As rms make no prot from one-stop shoppers, they must charge non-negative mar-
gins on their weak products, that is, 1, 2  0. This implies, however, that margins
on strong products are non-positive, say, 1 = m1  1  0, which contradicts the
condition 1  2 +   .
Therefore multi-stop shoppers must buy strong products in equilibrium.
Claim 4 Some multi-stop shoppers are active in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose all active consumers are one-stop shoppers. From Claim 2, m1 =
m2 = 0; hence, rms make zero prot and v1 = v2 = w. As v12+v12 corresponds to the total
value of buying one unit of both products from both rms, we thus have v12 + v12 = 2w.
However, ruling out multi-stop shopping requiresmaxfv12; v12g  w (= v1 = v2); it follows
that v12 = v12 = w, which implies 1 + 2 = . Hence, at least one rm i charges i > 0;
it would then be protable for that rm to encourage some consumers to buy only its
strong product, by slightly increasing i and decreasing i by the same amount: this
would trigger some multi-stop shopping, from which rm i would derive a positive prot.
Claim 5 Some one-stop shoppers are active in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there are only multi-stop shoppers who, from Claim 3, buy the strong
products. Consumers are willing to visit both rms if 2s  v12 (i.e., s  v12=2), but would
prefer one-stop shopping if s >  = v12  maxfv1; v2g; hence, we must have:
v12
2
  = v12  maxfv1; v2g;
which implies maxfv1; v2g  v12=2, and the demand from multi-stop shoppers is F (v12=2).
As consumers only buy strong products, rms must charge non-negative margins on these
products. Without loss of generality, suppose 2  1 ( 0), and consider the following
deviation for rm 1: keeping 1 constant, change 1 to:
~1 =
w    + 2   1
2
  "  w   
2
  " > 0;
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so as to increase the value o¤ered to one-stop shoppers to:
~v1 = w   1   ~1 =
w +    1   2
2
+ " =
v12
2
+ ":
This deviation does not a¤ect v12 nor  2 (which only depends on 1, 2 and 2), but
it decreases  1 to ~ 1 =  + ~1   2 = v12=2   "; as initially   v12=2, it follows that
the multi-stop shopping threshold becomes ~ = ~ 1 (< v12=2) < ~v1. This adjustment thus
induces some of the initial multi-stop shoppers to buy both products from rm 1 (those
whose shopping cost lies between ~ 1 and v12=2), from which rm 1 earns an extra prot
by selling its weak product (as ~1 > 0), and it, moreover, attracts some additional one-
stop shoppers (those whose shopping cost lies between v12=2 and ~v1), which generates
additional prot (as 1  0 and ~1 > 0).
Claims 4 and 5 establish part (i) of the Lemma. Part (ii) then follows from Claim 3,
while part (iii) follows from Claim 2.
B Extensions
We consider here two extensions briey discussed in the text, namely, bounded shopping
costs and online retailing.
B.1 Bounded shopping costs
The following propositions conrm that cross-subsidization keeps arising in equilibrium
whenever consumersshopping costs are su¢ ciently diverse. By contrast, when shopping
costs are all low enough, active consumers systematically visit both stores and only buy
strong products, which rms price above cost. Conversely, when shopping costs are all
high enough, consumers visit at most one rm, and symmetric Bertrand competition leads
both rms to o¤er the basket at cost.
B.1.1 Distribution with upper bound
We rst consider the e¤ect of an upper bound on consumersshopping costs:
Assumption A: The shopping cost s is distributed according to a cumulative distri-
bution function with positive density over [0; s], where s > 0.
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Proposition 10 Under Assumptions A and B:
 if s > j 1 (), there exists a unique equilibrium, with both types of shopping patterns
and the same prices as in the baseline model;
 if instead s  j 1 (), there exist multiple equilibria. In each equilibrium: (i) only
multi-stop shopping arises; and (ii) weak products are o¤ered at below-cost prices,
but rms only sell their strong products, with a positive margin ranging from h(s)
to    s  h(s).
Proof: Suppose that consumers shopping costs are distributed over [0; s], where
s > 0. It is straightforward to check that the rst four claims in the proof of Lemma 1
still hold; that is, in any equilibrium, there exist active multi-stop shoppers who buy the
strong products, and in addition, if there are active one-stop shoppers, thenm1 = m2 = 0.
We rst note that the equilibrium identied in the baseline model still exists when s
is large enough:
Claim 6 When s > j 1 (), then there exists an equilibrium with both types of shoppers:
consumers with a shopping cost lower than   = j 1 () engage in multi-stop shopping,
and face a margin  = h ( ) on each strong product; whereas those with a higher cost
favor one-stop shopping.
Proof. As shown in the text, there is a unique candidate equilibrium where both
types of shopping patterns arise, and is as described in the Claim. The existence of one-
stop shopping, however, requires s >   = j 1 (). Conversely, when this condition holds,
the margins m1 = m

2 = 0 and 

1 = 

2 = h (
) do support an equilibrium: indeed the
reasoning of the proof of Proposition 2 ensures that no deviation is protable.
Next, we show that one-stop shopping cannot arise if s is too low:
Claim 7 When s  j 1 (), then one-stop shopping does not arise in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose there exist some one-stop shoppers, which requires  < minfmaxfv1; v2g; sg.
Competition for these one-stop shoppers leads to m1 = m2 = 0, and thus  1 =  2 =
   1   2 < s, which implies 1 + 2 >    s > 2h(s). Therefore, at least one of the
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margins on strong products must exceed h(s). Suppose 1 > h(s); then 1 > h(s) > h(),
as s >  and h() is strictly increasing. Consider now the following deviation: decrease
1 to ~1 and increase 1 by the same amount, so as to maintain the total margin. This
does not a¤ect the prot from one-stop shoppers (which remains equal to zero), but
yields a prot from multi-stop shoppers, equal to ~1 = ~1F (~), where ~ =   ~1  2. As
d~1=d~1j~1=1 =  f()(1 h()), which is strictly negative as 1 > h(), such a deviation
is protable. Hence, one-stop shopping does not arise in equilibrium.
Claims 6 and 7 together establish the rst part of Proposition 10. We now characterize
the equilibria where all consumers are multi-stop shoppers.
Claim 8 When s  j 1 (), any margin prole such that 1 2 [h(s);    s   h(s)], 2 =
1    + s and 1 = 2    + s, constitutes an equilibrium in which all active consumers
are multi-stop shoppers.
Proof. Suppose there are only multi-stop shoppers who, from Claim 3, buy the
strong products. Consumers are willing to visit both rms if 2s  v12 (i.e., s  v12=2),
but would prefer one-stop shopping if s >  = v12   maxfv1; v2g; hence, we must have
  min fv12=2; sg, and the demand from multi-stop shoppers is F (min fv12=2; sg). As
consumers only buy strong products, rms must charge non-negative margins on these
products: 1; 2  0.
If s < min fv12=2; g, each rm can protably deviate by slightly raising the price
for its strong product: this increases the margin without a¤ecting the demand, equal to
F (s). Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume s  min fv12=2; g. The condition
  min fv12=2; sg then implies that either v12=2  min f ; sg, or v12=2   = s. We
consider these two cases in turn.
Consider the rst case, and note that the condition:
v12
2
  = v12  maxfv1; v2g
then implies maxfv1; v2g  v12=2. Without loss of generality, suppose 2  1 ( 0), and
consider the following deviation for rm 1: keeping 1 constant, reduce 1 so as to o¤er
~v1 = v12=2 + ", which amounts to charging:
~1 =
w    + 2   1
2
  "  w   
2
  " > 0:
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This deviation does not a¤ect v12 or  2 = v12   v2, but it decreases  1 to ~ 1 = v12   ~v1 =
v12=2   "; as initially  2    v12=2, it follows that the multi-stop shopping threshold
becomes ~ = ~ 1 (< v12=2) < ~v1. This adjustment thus induces some multi-stop shoppers
to buy everything from rm 1 (those whose shopping cost lies between ~ 1 and v12=2),
on which rm 1 earns an extra prot from selling its weak product (as ~1 > 0), and
it, moreover, attracts some additional one-stop shoppers (those whose shopping cost lies
between v12=2 and ~v1), generating additional prot (as 1  0 and ~1 > 0).
Hence, we cannot have an equilibrium of the type v12=2  min f ; sg.
Consider now the second case: s =   v12=2. Note rst that if  =  i = v12   vi <
 j = v12   vj, then rm i could again protably deviate by increasing the margin on its
strong product without a¤ecting the demand (as  i does not depend on i). Hence, we
must have s =  =  1 =  2, and thus v1 = v2, or m1 = m2 = m.
We now show that rmsmargins on weak products must satisfy 1; 2   h(s), and
margins on strong products must satisfy 1; 2  h(s). To see this, note that rm 1, say,
could induce some multi-stop shoppers to buy its weak product B as well, by reducing the
margin on its weak product, so that ~ 1 =  + ~1   2 <  1 (=  + 1   2) = s, keeping
the total margin constant: ~1 + ~1 = m1. By so doing, rm 1 would earn a prot equal
to:
1 = ~1F (~ 1) +m1(F (s)  F (~ 1))
= m1F (s)  ~1F ( + ~1   2) :
To rule out such a deviation, 1 must satisfy:
1 2 arg max
~11
 ~1F ( + ~1   2) ;
which, given the monotonicity of h(), amounts to:
1   h(s):
Alternatively, rm 1 could discourage some multi-stop shoppers by increasing ~1, so
that ~ 2 =  + 2   ~1 <  2 (=  + 2   1) = s, keeping ~1 unchanged. Doing so yields a
prot equal to:
1 = ~1F (~ 2) :
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Ruling out this deviation thus requires:
1 2 arg max
~11
~1F ( + 2   ~1) ;
or:
1  h(s):
The conditions 2   h(s) and 2  h(s) can be derived using the same logic.
Therefore, the margins for any candidate equilibria must satisfy (using  = +1 2 =
s):  h(s)  1 = 2    + s  h(s)    + s, implying s + 2h(s)  . Hence, an
equilibrium with only multi-stop shopping exists only when s  j 1 (). Conversely, when
this condition holds, any margins satisfying 1, 2 2 [h(s);  s h(s)], 2 = 1 +s and
1 = 2  + s constitute an equilibrium in which all consumers are multi-stop shoppers.
Claims 7 and 8 together establish the second part of Proposition 10. Q.E.D.
Hence, while rms always price their weak products below cost, it is only when some
consumers have high enough shopping costs, namely, when s > j 1 (), that cross-
subsidization actually occurs. Otherwise, all consumers patronize both rms and only
buy strong products. Indeed, in the limit case s = 0, where consumers incur no shopping
costs, each rm earns a margin of up to  on its strong product, reecting its comparative
advantage, as standard asymmetric Bertrand competition suggests.
B.1.2 Distribution with lower bound
We now turn to the impact of a lower bound on shopping costs:
Assumption A: The shopping cost s is distributed according to a cumulative distri-
bution function with positive density over [s;+1), where s < w.1
Proposition 11 Under Assumptions A and B:
 if s < =3, there exists a unique equilibrium, with both types of shopping patterns
and the same prices as in the baseline model;
1This assumption is needed for the viability of the markets, as consumers with shopping costs exceeding
w never visit any rm.
10
 if instead s > , there exist multiple equilibria in which: (i) only one-stop shopping
arises, and (ii) rms make zero prot;
 nally, if =3  s  , both types of equilibria coexist.2
Proof: Suppose that consumersshopping costs are distributed over [s;+1), where
s < w. We rst show that part of Lemma 1 still applies:
Lemma 2 Suppose that consumer shopping costs are distributed over [s;+1), where
s < w. Then, in equilibrium:
 some one-stop shoppers are active;
 m1 = m2 = 0; and
 active multi-stop shoppers buy strong products.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that the rst three claims of the proof of Lemma
1 in the baseline model remain valid: in equilibrium, some consumers are active (Claim
1); m1 = m2 = 0 whenever there are active one-stop shoppers (Claim 2), and active
multi-stop shoppers buy the strong products (Claim 3). This last claim establishes part
(iii) of Lemma 2, whereas Claim 2 implies that part (ii) of Lemma 2 follows from part
(i). To complete the proof, it su¢ ces to note that the proof of Claim 5 also remains valid,
which yields part (i).
We now proceed to establish the proposition. We rst note that multi-stop shopping
must arise when some consumers have low enough shopping costs:
Lemma 3 If s < =3, some multi-stop shoppers are active in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose all active consumers are one-stop shoppers. From Claim 2, price
competition for one-stop shoppers then leads to m1 = m2 = 0. Ruling out multi-stop
shopping requires v = w  v12   s = w      1   2   s, or (using m1 = m2 = 0)
1 + 2   + s. If rm 2, say, is the one that charges less on its strong product (i.e.,
2In the limit case s = , however, only those consumers with a shopping cost equal to  may opt for
multi-stop shopping.
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2  1), then we must have 2  ( + s) =2. Consider the following deviation for rm 1:
charge ~1 = " > 0 and ~1 =  " such that the total margin remains zero. The multi-stop
shopping threshold becomes:
~ =    ~1   2     " 
 + s
2
=
   s
2
  ":
As  > 3s (implying (   s) =2 > s), it follows that ~ > s for " su¢ ciently small. Hence,
rm 1 can induce some consumers to engage in multi-stop shopping and make a prot on
them.
Next, we show that there indeed exists an equilibrium with multi-stop shopping as
long as some consumersshopping costs are not too large:
Lemma 4 If s < , there exists an equilibrium exhibiting both types of shopping patterns,
in which rmstotal margins are zero (mi = 0) and the margins on their strong products
are equal to i = 
 = h ( ), where   = j 1 ().
Proof. Suppose s < . As discussed in the text, the unique candidate equilibrium
exhibiting both types of shopping patterns is such that: (i) both rms charge zero total
margins (mi = 0) and a positive margin on their strong products equal to 

i = 
 = h ( ),
where   = j 1 (); and (ii) consumers with a shopping cost lying between s and   engage
in multi-stop shopping, whereas those with a shopping cost lying between   and w are
one-stop shoppers. Therefore, this type of equilibrium exists when s <   = j 1(). As
the function j () is strictly increasing and satises j(s) = s + 2h(s) = s, the condition
s <   amounts to s < .
Conversely, these margins indeed constitute an equilibrium. By construction, given
the equilibrium prices charged by the other rm, a rm cannot make a prot on one-stop
shoppers, and charging  on the strong product maximizes the prot that a rm earns
from multi-stop shoppers.
It follows that the analysis of the baseline model still applies when the lower bound is
small enough, namely, when s < =3. From Lemmas 2 and 3, both types of shopping pat-
terns must arise in equilibrium; Lemma 4 then ensures that the unique candidate identied
in the text is indeed an equilibrium. This establishes the rst part of the Proposition.
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We now turn to the second part of the Proposition, and rst note that multi-stop
shopping cannot arise when all consumers have high shopping costs:
Lemma 5 If s > , there are no multi-stop shoppers in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, there are some active multi-stop shoppers. From
Lemma 2, m1 = m2 = 0 and multi-stop shoppers must buy strong products; hence,
 =    1   2 > s. As s > , it follows that 1 + 2 < 0; hence, at least one rm
must charge a negative margin on its strong product and incur a loss from serving multi-
stop shoppers. But this cannot be an equilibrium, as that rm could avoid the loss by
increasing its prices.
Finally, we show that when all consumers have large enough shopping costs, there
exists equilibria with no multi-stop shoppers.
Lemma 6 There exist equilibria with one-stop shopping if and only if s  =3. In these
equilibria, margins satisfy: (i) 1+ 1 = 2 + 2 = 0; (ii)    s  1; 2; 1 + 2   + s;
and (iii)  w1  1  w1 and  w2  2  w2.
Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium with only one-stop shopping. From Lemma
2, m1 = m2 = 0 and thus  =    1   2. For rm 1, say, it cannot be protable to
deviate by attracting one-stop shoppers, as this would require a negative total margin
~m1 < 0. Firm 1 could, however, deviate so as to induce some consumers to engage in
multi-stop shopping; more specically:
 it could induce some consumers to buy both strong products by charging ~1 such
that ~ 2 =    ~1 + 2 =    ~1   2 > s, or ~1 <    s  2; and
 alternatively, it could induce some consumers to buy both weak products by charging
~1 such that ~ 2 =   + 2   ~1 > s, or ~1 < 2      s.
Ruling out the rst type of deviation requires 2    s, while preventing the second
type of deviation requires 2   + s. Therefore, the equilibrium margin 2 must lie
between    s and  + s. Applying the same logic to rule out rm 2s deviations requires
the equilibrium margin 1 to lie between    s and  + s as well. Moreover, the margins
cannot exceed the social values, which requires  w1  1  w1 and  w2  2  w2.
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Conversely, any margins that satisfy: (i) 1+ 1 = 2 + 2 = 0; (ii)   s  1; 2; 1 +
2   + s; and (iii)  w1  1  w1 and  w2  2  w2 constitute an equilibrium in
which all active consumers are one-stop shoppers and both rms earn zero prot.
The above analysis shows that equilibrium margins must satisfy: (i)    s  1; 2,
implying 1 + 2  2   2s; and (ii) 1 + 2   + s. These two conditions then lead to
2 2s  +s, which amounts to =3  s. It thus follows that such an equilibrium exists
if and only if =3  s.
Combining Lemmas 5, 6 and 2 yields the second part of the Proposition, whereas
Lemmas 4 and 6 together yield the last part. Q.E.D.
Thus, cross-subsidization arises in equilibrium as long as some consumers have a shop-
ping cost lower than the extra value  o¤ered by combining both strong products, and
it does arise for certain when some consumers have a low enough shopping cost (namely,
lower than =3).
B.2 Non-linear pricing
We show here that our insights carry over when consumers have elastic individual de-
mands. We consider the following variant of the baseline model.
 Demand. Consumers obtain a gross utility uhi
 
qhi

from purchasing a quantity qhi of
good h = A;B from rm i = 1; 2; their individual demand is thus given by
dhi
 
phi

= arg max
qhi

uhi
 
qhi
  phi qhi 	 ;
where dhi
 
phi

is decreasing in phi , and the associated surplus is:
shi
 
phi

= max
qhi

uhi
 
qhi
  phi qhi 	 = uhi  dhi  phi   phi dhi  phi  :
 Demand. Each rm i = 1; 2 can supply any quantity qhi of good h = A;B at total cost
Chi
 
qhi

= khi + c
h
i q
h
i , where c
h
i denotes as before a constant marginal cost of production,
and khi now denotes a xed cost of supplying the good to a given consumer. For the sake
of exposition, we suppose that these xed costs are large enough to ensure that relevant
xed fees are all positive.3
3Alternatively, rms impose exclusivity provisions preventing consumers to buy the same good from
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 Non-linear pricing. It is optimal for each rm i to o¤er each good h using a cost-based
two-part tari¤ of the form T hi
 
qhi

= fhi + c
h
i q
h
i , where f
h
i denotes the xed fee that a
consumer must pay to obtain good h from rm i. A consumer buying this good from the
rm then obtains vhi = s
h
i
 
chi
  fhi .
 Comparative advantages. As in the baseline model, we assume that each rm enjoys a
comparative advantage on one of the products, and that these comparative advantages
are of the same magnitude:
wA1   wA2 = wB2   wB1   > 0;
wA1 + w
B
1 = w
A
2 + w
B
2  w > ;
where
whi  shi
 
chi
  khi
now denotes the maximal surplus that can be generated by rm is variety of good h.
No consumer has an incentive to buy a given good from both rms: he would have
to pay both xed fees, but would only buy from the rm with the lower marginal cost.
One-stop shoppers, who buy both goods from the same rm, thus pay both xed fees,
whereas multi-stop shoppers, who only buy one product from each rm, only pay one xed
to each rm. Hence, as in the baseline model, each rm i = 1; 2 o¤ers vi = w  i   i to
one-stop shoppers, whereas multi-stop shoppers obtain v12 = w +    1   2 if they buy
strong products, and v12 = w    1  2 if instead they buy the weak products, where
1 = f
A
1   kA1 (resp., 2 = fB2   kB2 ) and 1 = fB1   kB1 (resp., 2 = fA2   kA2 ) denote here
rm 1s (resp., rm 2s) xed fee marginson its strong and weak products. The same
analysis as before then shows that, in equilibrium, rms sell their baskets at cost (i.e.,
fAi + f
B
i = k
A
i + k
B
i , and thus i =  i) but derive a prot from their strong products:
consumers with s <  =    1   2 engage in multi-stop shopping and buy both rms
strong products, giving rm i a prot equal to
i = 1F (   1   2) :
another rm. In that situation, the analysis applies even in the absence of any xed cost of servicing a
consumer.
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Hence, in equilibrium, both rms charge i = 
 = h ( ), where   = j 1 ().
Interestingly, although each tari¤ is individually e¢ cient (namely, phi = c
h
i , which
induces consumers to buy the e¢ cient quantity that yields the maximal surplus whi ), the
equilibrium tari¤s still feature double marginalization: keeping total fees equal to total
xed costs, the xed fees charged on strong products exceed the level that would maximize
industry prot.
B.3 Online retailing
The development of online retailing o¤ers consumers an alternative way of fullling their
needs, but has also an impact on retail competition and on retailerspricing strategies. To
explore some of these implications, consider the following variant of the baseline model,
where a fraction  of internet-savvyconsumers see their shopping costs drop to zero.
That is, the distribution of shopping costs is then characterized by a cumulative distrib-
ution function F (s) and a density f (s), where F (0) =  and, for s > 0:
f (s) = (1  ) f (s) and F (s) = + (1  )F (s) :
The inverse hazard rate becomes:
h (s) = h (s) +

1  
1
f (s)
:
Hence:
(i) this hazard rate still increases with s if f (s) does not increase with s, or if  is not
too large;4 and
(ii) the hazard rate moreover increases with the proportion  of internet-savvycon-
sumers.
4If f 0 (s) > 0, then h (s) still increases with s in the relevant range s 2 [0; ] if:

1   < maxs2[0;]ff
2 (s)
h0 (s)
f 0 (s)
g:
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Condition (i) ensures that the equilibrium characterization of Proposition 2 remains
valid; condition (ii) then implies that the equilibrium prices charged on strong products
increase with .
More generally, the following proposition shows that the development of online retail-
ing leads to an increase in the prices of strong products whenever it inates the inverse
hazard rate:
Proposition 12 Suppose that the development of online retailing a¤ects the distribution
of shopping costs in such a way that: (i) the distribution still satises Assumptions A and
B; and (ii) the inverse hazard rate is inated. Then there exists a unique equilibrium, in
which rms sell their baskets at cost but charge a positive margin on their strong products
(and thus a negative margin on their weak products); furthermore, the equilibrium prices
of strong products increase with the development of online retailing.
Proof. Let us index the development of online retailing by a parameter  and sup-
pose that the associated distribution of shopping costs, characterized by a cumulative
distribution function F (s;) with density f (s;), satises Assumptions A and B, and is,
moreover, such that:
h (s;)  F (s;)
f (s;)
;
increases with . The analysis developed for the baseline model carries over: the equi-
librium margin, , and the associated multi-stop shopping threshold, 

 =    2, are
now such that  = h (

;). Hence, the margin 

 satises:
 = h (   2;) :
As h (s;) increases with both s and , it follows that  increases with . Conversely,
the threshold   is such that:
    
2
= h ( ;) :
Hence, as h (s;) increases with both s and ,   decreases as  increases.
Proposition 12 points out that the development of online sales is not only protable,
but also consistent with an increase in the prices of strong products: while one-stop
shoppers can still buy rmsbaskets at cost, multi-stop shoppers (including those buying
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online) face higher prices as the proportion of online customers increases. The intuition
is straightforward: an increase in the development of online activity, as measured, for
instance, by the proportion  of internet-savvyconsumers, boosts multi-stop shopping,
which benets the rms but also encourages them to take advantage of this shift in demand
by raising the prices of their strong products at the expense of the less internet-savvy
multi-stop shoppers.
C Heterogeneous preferences
C.1 Horizontal di¤erentiation
C.1.1 Setting
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling unit-length segment and indexed
by their location x 2 [0; 1], whereas the rmso¤erings are located at the two ends of
the segment: A1 and B1 are located at 0, say, whereas A2 and B2 are located at 1. A
consumer located at a distance x from one variety of a product incurs a cost tx when
purchasing that variety, and t (1  x) when purchasing the other variety. We assume
consumers shopping costs are distributed independently of their locations, according to
a cumulative distribution function F (s) with positive density over [0; s], where s >  (to
allow for one-stop shopping as well as multi-stop shopping), and further assume that w
is large enough, relatively to s, to ensure the market is fully covered in equilibrium.
A one-stop shopper located at x obtains a net value w 2tx m1 s from patronizing
rm 1 and w  2t (1  x) m2  s from going instead to rm 2. Thus, one-stop shoppers
favor rm 1 if
x < x^  1
2
  m1  m2
4t
:
In addition, consumers with x < x^ favor one-stop shopping (at rm 1) to multi-stop
shopping (and purchasing strong products),5 if their shopping cost is su¢ ciently large,
namely, if
s > 1(x)   1   t+ 2tx;
5We will check ex post that multi-stop shoppers indeed favor the strong products.
18
where  1 =  + 1   2. Likewise, consumers located at x > x^ prefer one-stop shopping
(at rm 2) if
s  2(x)   2 + t  2tx;
where  2 =  + 2   1.
Thus, the demand for the bundles A1  B1 and A2  B2 are given respectively as
D1 
Z x^
0
[1  F (1(x))] dx;
D2 
Z 1
x^
[1  F (2(x))] dx:
whereas multi-stop shoppersdemand for the two strong products, A1 and B2, is given by
D 
Z x^
0
F (1(x))dx+
Z 1
x^
F (2(x))dx:
Firm is total prot can then be written as
i = miDi + iD = mi (Di +D)  iD:
C.1.2 Equilibrium analysis
To characterize the equilibrium margins, we focus on rm 1, say, and consider the impact
of a small change in 1 and 1, and evaluate it at a symmetric candidate equilibrium.
Consider rst a modication of 1 by dr together with a change of 1 by  dr, so that
the total margin for rm 1s basket remains unchanged. Such modication does not a¤ect
the behavior of one-stop shoppers; in particular, the threshold x^ is not a¤ected. Yet (see
Figure 1):
 On the one hand, rm 1 obtains a larger margin from multi-stop shoppers, who only
buy A1 from it; the associated gain is Ddr.
 On the other hand, it induces some one-stop shoppers, on which rm 1 was earning
the margin 1, to switch to multi-stop shopping; hence:
 for x < x^, these marginal consumers (namely, those with s = 1(x)) now
buy both products from rm 1; the resulting gain for rm 1 is equal to
1
Z x^
0
f(1(x))dxdr;
19
 for x > x^, consumers with s = 2(x) now patronize rm 2; the resulting loss
for rm 1 is equal to  1
Z 1
x^
f(2(x))dxdr.
In equilibrium, the overall impact on rm 1s prot must be zero, which (using sym-
metry) leads to the following rst-order condition:
1
Z x^
0
f(1(x))dx  1
Z 1
x^
f(2(x))dx+D = 0:
Evaluating this condition for symmetric equilibrium margins 1 = 2 =  and 1 =
2 = m   , where m denotes the total margin charged by both rms (hence, we have
 1 =  2 =  =  + 2 m and x^ = 1=2),6 we obtain
 =
m
2
  ~h( ; t); (1)
where, letting  (s)  R s
0
F (x)dx denote the primitive of F (s):
~h ( ; t) 
Z 1=2
0
F (1(x))dxZ 1=2
0
f(1(x))dx

Z 
 t
F (s)dsZ 
 t
f(s)ds
=
 ()   (   t)
F ()  F (   t)
converges towards the inverse hazard rate h () as t goes to zero: limt!0 ~h (~ ; t) = h ().
Likewise, its derivative converges towards h0 () as t goes to zero:
~h0( ; t) = 1  ~h( ; t) f()  f(   t)
F ()  F (   t) ;
leading to:
lim
t!0
~h0( ; t) = 1  h () f
0 ()
f()
= h0 () :
It follows that ~h( ; t) is strictly increasing in  when t is small enough.7
6In addition, 2(x) = 1(1  x) and thus:Z x^
0
f(1(x))dx =
Z 1
x^
f(2(x))dx =
Z 1=2
0
f(1(x))dx;Z x^
0
F (1(x))dx =
Z 1
x^
F (2(x))dx =
Z 1=2
0
F (1(x))dx:
7If the density f (s) weakly decreases in s, then ~h0()  1 > 0.
20
Using  =  + 2 m, (1) yields  =    2~h ( ; t). The equilibrium threshold, ~ , thus
solves ~ =  1 (; t), where
 ( ; t)   + 2~h( ; t) (2)
is increasing in  . Hence, the equilibrium threshold ~ (t) is uniquely dened by
~ (t)   1 (; t) : (3)
Consider now a small increase in 1 by dr, keeping 1 constant. This does not a¤ect
consumerschoices between multi-stop shopping and patronizing rm 2; yet:
 On the one hand, rm 1 charges a larger margin to the one-stop shoppers who
patronize it; the associated gain is D1dr.
 On the other hand, it induces some one-stop shoppers that were patronizing to
switch to either multi-stop shopping, or to visiting rm 2 instead; hence:
 for x 2 [0; 1=2], consumers with s = 1(x) switch to multi-stop shopping; the
resulting loss for rm 1 is equal to  1
Z 1=2
0
f(1(x))dxdr;
 for x = x^ = 1=2, one-stop shoppers switch to rm 2; the resulting loss for rm
1 is equal to  m1
4t
(1  F ( 1)) dr.
In equilibrium, these e¤ects must cancel out, which leads to a second rst-order con-
dition:
1
Z 1=2
0
f(1(x))dx+
m1
4t
(1  F ( 1)) = D1:
Evaluating this condition for symmetric equilibrium margins yields
 =
4t
Z 1=2
0
[1  F (1(x))] dx m (1  F ())
4t
Z 1=2
0
f(1(x))dx
=
2t m (1  F ())
2 [F ()  F (   t)]  
~h ( ; t) :
Comparing with (1) yields the equilibrium total margin:
~m (t)  2t
1  F (~ (t)  t) : (4)
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The equilibrium margins for weak and strong products are then respectively given by
~ (t) =
t
1  F (~ (t)  t)  
~h(~ (t) ; t); (5)
~ (t) =
t
1  F (~ (t)  t) +
~h(~ (t) ; t): (6)
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Comparative statics. Note that ~ (t) is continuous in t and limt!0 ~ (0) =  h() < 0.
Therefore, there exists t > 0 such that ~ (t) < 0 for t 2 [0; t]. We now show that ~m (t)
and ~ (t) both increase in t for su¢ ciently small t. For this purpose, we rst show that
~ (t) increases in t. Using ~ (t) =    2~h(~ (t) ; t), we obtain
~ 0 (t) =  2 d
dt
h
~h(~ (t) ; t)
i
=  2~h0(~ (t) ; t)~ 0 (t)  2@
~h
@t
(~ (t) ; t) :
Hence, we have
~ 0 (t) =
 2@~h
@t
(~ (t) ; t)
1 + 2~h0(~ (t) ; t)
:
Note that:
@~h( ; t)
@t
=
f(   t)
h
h(   t)  ~h( ; t)
i
F ()  F (   t) =
f(   t)
F ()  F (   t)
Z 
 t
[h(s)  h(   t)] f(s)dsZ 
 t
f(s)ds
> 0:
Hence, ~ 0 (t) > 0, which further implies
d
dt
h
~h(~ (t) ; t)
i
=  ~
0 (t)
2
< 0:
From (4), we have
~m0 (t) =
2
1  F (~ (t)  t) + 2t
f (~ (t)  t) [~ 0 (t)  1]
[1  F (~ (t)  t)]2 ;
which is positive for t su¢ ciently small.
Finally, from (5), we have:
~0 (t) =
~m0 (t)
2
  d
dt
h
~h(~ (t) ; t)
i
>
~m0 (t)
2
:
Therefore, ~0 (t) is also positive for t su¢ ciently small.
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Existence. We show now the above margins constitute indeed an equilibrium when t is
close to 0. For this purpose, it su¢ ces to show that rm is prot function is quasi-concave
in mi and i, in the relevant range, when t approaches zero. The following assumption is
su¢ cient to establish quasi-concavity:
Assumption B: The density function f () is non-increasing.
As the rms are symmetric, we focus on rm 1 and rewrite its prot function as follows
(taking rm 2s margins ~m (t) and ~ (t) as given):
1 (m1; 1) = m1D1 (m1; 1) + 1D (m1; 1) ;
where
D1 (m1; 1) 
Z x^(m1)
0
[1  F (1 (x;m1   1))] dx;
D (m1; 1) 
Z x^(m1)
0
F (1 (x;m1   1)) dx+
Z 1
x^(m1)
F (2 (x; 1)) dx;
and
x^ (m1)  minfmaxf1
2
  m1   ~m (t)
4t
; 0g; 1g;
1 (x;m1   1)  maxf +m1   1   ~ (t)  t+ 2tx; 0g;
2 (x; 1)  maxf + ~ (t)  1 + t  2tx; 0g:
Di¤erentiating D and D1 with respect to m1 and 1, we obtain:
@D
@1
(m1; 1) =  
Z x^
0
f (1 (x;m1   1)) dx 
Z 1
x^
f (2 (x; 1)) dx < 0;
@D
@m1
(m1; 1) =
@D1
@1
(m1; 1) =
Z x^
0
f (1 (x;m1   1)) dx  0;
@D1
@m1
(m1; 1) =  
Z x^
0
f (1 (x;m1   1)) dx 
1  F (1 (x^;m1   1))
4t
< 0:
Obviously, charging 1 < 0 and m1 < 0 is never optimal. Suppose now that rm 1
charges 1 < 0 and m1  0, and consider raising 1 to 0 while maintaining m1. It avoids
the loss from selling the strong product to multi-stop shoppers, without reducing the
demand from one-stop shoppers, as @D1=@1  0. Suppose instead that rm 1 charges
m1 < 0 and 1 > 0, and consider raising m1 to 0. This avoids the loss on one-stop
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shoppers, without reducing the demand for the strong product from multi-stop shoppers,
as @D=@m1  0.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to rm 1s deviations such
that 1  0 and m1  0. Furthermore, if rm 1 deviates m1  ~m (t) + 2t, then it
does not attract any one-stop shopper and its prot remains the same as when charging
m1 = ~m2 + 2t, where x^ = 0:
1 (m1; 1) = 1 ( ~m (t) + 2t; 1) = 1
Z 1
0
F (2 (x; 1)) dx:
In addition, for m1 = ~m (t) + 2t, x^ = 0 implies D1 = @D=@m1 = 0, and thus:8
@1
@m1

m1= ~m(t)+2t
=  m1 1  F ( 2 + t)
4t
< 0:
It follows that it is never optimal for rm 1 to deviate to m1  ~m (t) + 2t.
If instead rm 1 deviates to m1 < ~m (t)  2t, it attracts all one-stop shoppers and its
prot is equal to
1 (m1; 1) =
Z 1
0
[1  F (1 (x;m1   1))] dx+ 1
Z 1
0
F (1 (x;m1   1)) dx
= m1   (m1   1)
Z 1
0
[1  F (1 (x;m1   1))] dx:
It follows that a simultaneous increase in both m1 and 1 would increase rm 1s prot.
As the prot function 1 (m1; 1) is continuous at the boundary m1 = ~m (t)   2t, it is
never optimal for rm 1 to deviate to m1 < ~m (t)  2t.
Hence, without loss of generality we can restrict attention to rm 1s deviations such
that m1 2 [ ~m (t)  2t; ~m (t) + 2t), for which x^ (m1) = 12   m1  ~m(t)4t 2 (0; 1]. We now show
that, in that range, the prot function 1 (m1; 1) is strictly concave when t is close to 0.
The second-order derivatives of the demand functions are given by:
@2D
@21
=
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx+
Z 1
x^
f 0 (2 (x; 1)) dx;
@2D
@m21
=
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx 
f (1 (x^;m1   1))
4t
@2D
@1@m1
=  
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx;
8Note that 2 + t = + ~ (t)  1 + t < + t. The assumption s >  then implies s  + t for t small
enough, which ensures that some one-stop shoppers remain active following rm 1s deviation.
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and
@2D1
@21
=  
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx;
@2D1
@m21
=  
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx+
3f (1 (x^;m1   1))
8t
;
@2D1
@m1@1
=
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx 
f (1 (x^;m1   1))
4t
:
Di¤erentiating 1 with respect to 1, we obtain
@1
@1
= D +m1
@D1
@1
+ 1
@D
@1
and:
@21
@21
= 2
@D
@1
+m1
@2D1
@21
+ 1
@2D
@21
=  2
Z x^
0
f (1 (x;m1   1)) dx+
Z 1
x^
f (2 (x; 1)) dx

 m1
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx
+1
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)))dx+
Z 1
x^
f 0 (2 (x; 1)) dx

=   (	1 + 	2) ;
where
	1 
Z x^
0
[2f (1 (x;m1   1)) + (m1   1) f 0 (1 (x;m1   1))] dx;
	2 
Z 1
x^
[2f (2 (x; 1))  1f 0 (2 (x; 1))] dx:
We show now this second-order derivative is negative when t approaches zero. As rm
1s relevant deviations are such that 1  0 andm1  ~m (t)+2t, and f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) 
0 under Assumption B, we have:
	1 
Z x^
0
f2f (1 (x;m1   1)) + [ ~m (t) + 2t] f 0 (1 (x;m1   1))g dx

Z x^
0
2f (1 (x;m1   1)) dx+ [ ~m (t) + 2t] max
s2[0;s]
f 0 (s)

Z x^
0
2f ( + ~m+ 3t) dx+ [ ~m (t) + 2t] max
s2[0;s]
f 0 (s) ; (7)
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where the second inequality uses x^  1 and the last one follows from Assumption Band
(using m1  ~m (t) + 2t and 1  0):
1 (x;m1   1) =  +m1   1   ~  t+ 2tx   + ~m (t) + 3t: (8)
Likewise, we have:
	2 
Z 1
x^
2f (2 (x; 1)) dx

Z 1
x^
2f ( + t) dx;
where the second inequality follows from Assumption Band 2 (x; 1) = + ~  1 + t 
2tx   + t. Using Assumption Band ~m (t) + 2t  0, we thus have:
@21
@21
  	1 (t) ;
where
	1 (t) 
Z 1
0
2f ( + ~m (t) + 3t) dx+ [ ~m (t) + 2t] max
s2[0;s]
f 0 (s) ;
and
lim
t!0
	1 (t) = 2f () > 0:
It follows that @
21
@21
is negative when t is close to zero.
Di¤erentiating 1 with respect to m1, we obtain
@1
@m1
= D1 +m1
@D1
@m1
+ 1
@D
@m1
and:
@21
@m21
= 2
@D1
@m1
+m1
@2D1
@m21
+ 1
@2D
@m21
=  2
Z x^
0
f (1 (x;m1   1)) dx+
1  F (1 (x^;m1   1))
4t

+m1

 
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx+
3f (1 (x^;m1   1))
8t

+1
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx 
f (1 (x^;m1   1))
4t

=  	1  	3;
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where
	3  1  F (1 (x^;m1   1))
2t
  3m1f (1 (x^;m1   1))
8t
+
1f (1 (x^;m1   1))
4t
:
We have:
	3  1  F ( + ~m (t) + 3t)
2t
  3f (0) ~m (t) + 2t
8t
=
1  F ( + ~m (t) + 3t)
2t
  3f (0)
4

1 +
1
1  F (~ (t)  t)

 1  F ( + ~m (t) + 3t)
2t
  3f (0)
4
2  F ()
1  F () :
where the rst inequality follows fromm1  ~m (t)+2t, 1  0, Assumption Band (8), the
equality stems from (4), and the last inequality follows from ~ (t) t =  2~h (~ (t) ; t) t <
. Using (7), we then have:
@21
@m21
  	2 (t) ;
where
	2 (t)  [ ~m (t) + 2t] max
s2[0;s]
f 0 (s) +
1  F ( + ~m (t) + 3t)
2t
  3f (0)
4
2  F ()
1  F () ;
and
lim
t!0
	2 (t) = +1:
It follows that @
21
@m21
is negative and moreover goes to  1 as t tends to zero.
Finally, the remaining second-order derivative of the prot function is given by:
@21
@1@m1
=
@D
@m1
+
@D1
@1
+m1
@2D1
@1@m1
+ 1
@2D
@1@m1
= 2
Z x^
0
f (1 (x;m1   1)) dx+m1
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx 
f (1 (x^;m1   1))
4t

 1
Z x^
0
f 0 (1 (x;m1   1)) dx
= 	1   m1f (1 (x^;m1   1))
4t
:
We have:
@21
@1@m1
 	1   [ ~m (t) + 2t] f (0)
4t
= 	1   f (0)
2

1 +
1
1  F (~ (t)  t)

 	1   f (0)
2
2  F ()
1  F () ;
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where the rst inequality follows from m1  ~m (t) + 2t and Assumption B, whereas the
other two steps stem again from (4) and ~ (t)  t < . Using (7), we thus have:
@21
@1@m1
 	3 (t) ;
where
	3 (t)  [ ~m (t) + 2t] max
s2[0;s]
f 0 (s)  f (0)
2
2  F ()
1  F ()
and
lim
t!0
	3 (t) =  
f (0)
2
2  F ()
1  F () :
Conversely:
@21
@1@m1
 	1
=
Z x^
0
[2f (1 (x;m1   1)) + (m1   1) f 0 (1 (x;m1   1))] dx

Z x^
0

2f(0)  1 min
s2[0;s]
f 0(s)

dx
 2f(0)  wA1 min
s2[0;s]
f 0(s);
where the rst two inequalities follow from m1  0 and Assumption B, whereas the last
one stems from x^  1, Assumption Band the fact that, without loss of generality, we
can restrict attention to deviations such that 1  wA1 , the surplus generated by rm 1s
variety of product A. We thus have: @21@1@m1
  	4 (t) ;
where
	4 (t) = max
f (0)2 2  F ()1  F ()   [ ~m (t) + 2t] maxs2[0;s] f 0 (s)
 ; 2f (0)  wA1 mins2[0;s] f 0 (s)

and
lim
t!0
	4 (t) = 	  max

f (0)
2
2  F ()
1  F () ; 2f (0)  w
A
1 min
s2[0;s]
f 0 (s)

:
It follows that j @21
@1@m1
j remains bounded as t goes to zero.
Summarizing the above analysis, we can conclude that as t ! 0, in the relevant
range the second-order derivatives @
21
@21
and @
21
@m21
are both negative and the Hessian,
H = @
21
@21
@21
@m21
 

@21
@1@m1
2
is positive. More precisely, x t^0 > 0 and the associated
relevant range R  m1 2 [0; ~m (t) + 2t] ; 1 2 0; wA1 	. We have:
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 as @21
@21
(m1; 1)   	1 (t) for any (m1; 1) 2 R, and limt!0 	1 (t) = 2f () > 0,
there exists t^1 such that @
21
@21
() <  f () < 0 in the range R;
 as @21
@m21
(m1; 1)   	2 (t) for any (m1; 1) 2 R, and limt!0 	2 (t) = +1, there
exists t^2 such that @
21
@m21
() <  4	2=f () in the range R;
 as
 @21@1@m1 (m1; 1)  	4 (t) for any (m1; 1) 2 R, and limt!0 	4 (t) = 	 (> 0),
there exists t^3 such that
 @21@1@m1 () < 2	 in the range R;
It follows that, for t < t^  mint^0; t^1; t^2; t^3	, @21@21 (m1; 1) < 0, @21@m21 (m1; 1) < 0 and
H (m1; 1) > 0 for any (m1; 1) 2 R. Hence, for t < t^, the prot function  (m1; 1) is
thus strictly concave in the range R.
C.1.4 Illustration: uniform distribution
To further characterize the scope for cross-subsidization, we consider here the case where
the shopping cost is uniformly distributed over [0; s]. We thus have f (s) = 1=s, F (s) =
s=s, h (s) = s and
~h ( ; t) = 2
Z 1=2
0
(   t+ 2tx)dx =    t
2
:
Equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium threshold is given by:
~ (t) =
 + t
3
: (9)
We focus on the case where t  =2, which ensures that t  ~ (t), and moreover assume
that s > 7=2; as we will see, this ensures that the prot functions are strictly concave in
the relevant range.
The equilibrium margins are then:
~m (t) =
2ts
s  [~ (t)  t] =
6ts
3s+ 2t   ;
~ (t) =
ts
s  [~ (t)  t]  

~ (t)  t
2

=
3ts
3s   + 2t  
2   t
6
:
It can be checked that ~ (t) increases with t:
~0 (t) =
s [s  ~ (t)] + ts
3
fs  [~ (t)  t]g2 +
1
6
> 0:
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Moreover, ~ (0) =    =   
3
< 0 and ~ (=2) = t=2 > 0. It follows that there exists a
threshold t 2 (0; =2) such that ~ (t) < 0 if and only if t < t. Solving for ~ (t) = 0, or
22   6s   (5   21s) t+ 2t2 = 0;
yields:
t =
3
p
2   18s + 49s2   (21s  5)
4
:
Existence. We now check for the concavity of the prot functions. Note that
~m (t) =
2t
1  ~(t) t
s
> 2t:
Conversely, the condition  < 2s=7 yields:
~m (t) =
6ts
3s+ 2t   
6ts
3s   <
6ts
3s  2s
7
=
42
19
t:
Using F (s) = s=s, we have
	1 =
2x^
s
; 	2 =
2 (1  x^)
s
;
and thus
@21
@21
=  2
s
:
Furthermore:
	3  s  1 (x^;m1   1)
2ts
  3m1
8ts
+
1
4ts
:
Therefore:
@21
@m21
=   (	1 + 	3) =  

2x^
s
+
s  1 (x^;m1   1)
2ts
  3m1
8ts
+
1
4ts

:
Using
1 (x^;m1   1) =  +
m1 + ~m (t)
2
  1   ~ (t)
and
x^ =
1
2
  m1   ~m (t)
4t
;
we have:
@21
@m21
=   1
2s

s  
t
+
61 + 8t  9m1 + 2 ~m (t) + 4~ (t)
4t

:
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As m1  ~m (t) + 2t and 1  0 in the relevant range, and focusing on ~ (t)  0 (i.e.,
~ (t)  ~m (t)), we have:
@21
@m21
   1
2s

s  
t
  3 ~m (t) + 10t
4t

<   1
2s

s  
t
  79
19

;
where the last inequality follows from ~m (t) < 42t=19. Furthermore, we have:
@21
@21
@21
@m21
= (	1 + 	2) (	1 + 	3)
>
1
s2

s  
t
  79
19

:
Finally,
@21
@1@m1
=
2x^
s
  m1
4ts
=
4t  3m1 + 2 ~m (t)
4ts
:
Using (0 <) ~m (t) 2t  m1  ~m (t)+2t, lower and upper bounds for the above expression
are given by
  ~m (t)  2t
4ts
 @
21
@1@m1
 10t  ~m (t)
4ts
:
Therefore:
j @
21
@1@m1
j  maxf ~m (t) + 2t; 10t  ~m (t)g
4ts
=
10t  ~m (t)
4ts
;
where the last equality comes from the fact that ~m (t) < 42t=19. As in addition ~m (t) > 2t
@21
@1@m1
2


8t
4ts
2
=
4
s2
:
Therefore, H > 0 if
1
s2

s  
t
  79
19

 4
s2
;
which holds when
t < t^  19
155
(s  ) :
Finally, it can be checked that t^ > t:
t^  t
s
= 


s

;
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where
 (z)  3331
620
  3
4
p
z2   18z + 49  851
620
z
is positive in the relevant range =s < 2=7 ' 0:285:
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C.2 Stand-alone demand for weak products
We extend the previous model by introducing some consumers interested only in specic
products. Intuitively, the scope for cross-subsidization decreases as more consumers are
interested in weak products, as this discourages rms from selling these products below
cost. To explore this further, we thus assume here that, in addition to the unit-mass
population of consumers interested in both products, with heterogeneous preferences à la
Hotelling described above and shopping costs uniformly distributed over [0; s], a mass !
of consumers are only interested in the weak products.
For the sake of exposition, we assume that weak products are also supplied at cost
by a competitive fringe. This deters rms from deviating and exploit solely the stand-
alone demand for weak products. We also assume that ! is su¢ ciently small, so that in
equilibrium rms are willing to serve one-stop shoppers as well as multi-stop shoppers 
that is, they are not willing to drop their weak products. Firm is prot prot is then
given by:
i = miDi + iD + !i = mi (Di +D)  i (D   !) :
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To ensure that both types of shopping patterns arise, we assume that the distribution
of shopping cost is su¢ ciently dispersed and that t and ! are su¢ ciently small:
t <

3
; ! <

3s
and  <
2s
7
: (10)
As we will see, these restrictions indeed ensure that the equilibrium threshold for multi-
stop shopping satises ~ < .
C.2.1 Comparative statics
We follow the same approach as above, and rst consider a small deviation in the margins
of rm 1, say, keeping constant the total margin for its basket. Compared with the
previous analysis, the only change is that this deviation now reduces the margin earned
on those consumers who are only interested in weak products; as a result, the rst-order
condition becomes
 =
m
2
  ~h() + s!; (11)
where as before:
~h ( ; t) =
Z 1=2
0
F (1(x))dxZ 1=2
0
f(1(x))dx
=    t
2
:
Using  = + 2 m, the rst-order condition (11) yields  + 2~h ( ; t) = + 2s!, leading
to
~ (t; !) =
t+  + 2s!
3
; (12)
where, under (10):9
~ (t; !) <
2
3
<
4s
21
: (13)
Consider in turn a small deviation in 1, keeping 1 constant. This deviation now
a¤ects the margin earned on consumers only interested in weak products; as a result, the
9Under (10), we have:
~ (t; !) =
t+  + 2S!
3
<
1
3


3
+  + 2S

3S

=
2
3
:
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associated rst-order condition becomes:
 =  m
2t
(s  ) + s 

   t
2

+ 2s!: (14)
Combining this condition with (11) yields ~m (t; !) = m^ (t; !; ~ (t; !)), where:
m^ (t; !; )  2ts (1 + !)
s   + t ;
where ~m (t; !) > 0, as (13) implies s  ~ (t; !) + t > 0, and:
@m^
@t
(t; !; ) =
2s (1 + !) (s  )
(s+ t  )2 ;
@m^
@!
(t; !; ) =
2ts
s+ t   ;
@m^
@
(t; !; ) =
2ts (1 + !)
(s+ t  )2 :
Hence:
@ ~m
@t
(t; !) =
@m^
@t
(t; !; ~ (t; !)) +
@m^
@
(t; !; ~ (t; !))
@~ (t; !)
@t
(t; !)
=
2s (1 + !) (s  ~ (t; !))
(s+ t  )2 +
2ts (1 + !)
3 (s+ t  )2
> 0;
@ ~m
@!
(t; !) =
@m^
@!
(t; !; ~ (t; !)) +
@m^
@
(t; !; ~ (t; !))
@~ (t; !)
@!
(t; !)
=
2ts
s+ t   +
4ts2 (1 + !)
3 (s+ t  )2
> 0;
where the inequalities follows from (13). These conditions moreover impose an upper
bound on the equilibrium total margin:
~m (t; !) =
6st (1 + !)
3s+ 2t     2s! 
138
53
t: (15)
Using (11) yields the equilibrium margin on weak products:
~ (t; !) =
~m (t; !)
2
+
t
2
  ~ (t; !) + s!;
and thus:
@~
@t
(t; !) =
1
2
@ ~m
@t
(t; !) +
1
2
  @~
@t
(t; !) > 0;
@~
@!
(t; !) =
1
2
@ ~m
@!
(t; !) + s > 0;
where the inequalities follow from the comparative statics for ~m (t; !) and from @~=@t =
1=3 < 1=2.
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As the equilibrium margin ~ increases in t and !, there is a boundary curve of the
form t =  (!), where  (!) is decreasing in !, such that ~ ( (!) ; !) = 0, and ~ (t; !) < 0
for t <  (!). Furthermore, for ! = 0 we have seen in the previous subsection and showed
that ~ (0; t) < 0 as long as
t <  (0) = t =
3
p
2   18s + 49s2   (21s  5)
4
;
where t 2 (0; =2).
Finally, for ! = ! = =3s, ~ (!; t) < 0 as long as
t <  (!) = t 
q
(63s+ 5)2 + 32 (9s  5)  (63s+ 5)
12
:
As  (!) is decreasing in !, t < t.
C.2.2 Existence
By construction, marginal deviations from the margins characterized above are not prof-
itable. To establish existence, we now check that larger deviations are not protable either.
The arguments previously used for the case ! = 0 still ensure that, without loss of gener-
ality, we can restrict attention to non-negative margins mi and i. In addition, no rm i
has an incentive to charge mi < ~m (t; !)  2t. Furthermore, as rmsprots are linear in
the mass ! of consumers interested only in weak products, the second-order derivatives
of these prot functions with respect to mi and i are the same as before. For example,
for rm 1 we have:
@21
@21
=  2
s
< 0;
@21
@m21
=   1
2s

s  
t
+
61 + 8t  9m1 + 2 ~m (t; !) + 4~ (t; !)
4t

;
@21
@1@m1
=
4t  3m1 + 2 ~m (t; !)
4ts
:
We now check that @21=@m21 < 0 andH > 0 in the range ~m (t; !)+2t  m1  ~m (t; !)+2t
and 1  0. Focusing on ~ (t; !)  0 (i.e., ~ (t; !)  ~m (t; !)), we have:
@21
@m21
   1
2s

s  
t
  3 ~m (t; !) + 10t
4t

<   1
2s

s  
t
  236
53

;
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where the last inequality follows from (15). Furthermore, we have:
@21
@21
@21
@m21
= (	1 + 	2) (	1 + 	3)
>
1
s2

s  
t
  236
53

:
Finally,
@21
@1@m1
=
2x^
s
  m1
4ts
=
4t  3m1 + 2 ~m (t)
4ts
:
Using (0 <) ~m (t; !)   2t  m1  ~m (t; !) + 2t, lower and upper bounds for the above
expression are given by
  ~m (t; !)  2t
4ts
 @
21
@1@m1
 10t  ~m (t; !)
4ts
:
Therefore:
j @
21
@1@m1
j  maxf ~m (t; !) + 2t; 10t  ~m (t; !)g
4ts
=
10t  ~m (t; !)
4ts
;
where the last equality comes from (15). As in addition ~m (t) > 2t, we have:
@21
@1@m1
2


8t
4ts
2
=
4
s2
:
Therefore, H > 0 if
1
s2

s  
t
  236
53

 4
s2
;
which amounts to:
t < t^  53
448
(s  ) :
It can be checked that t^ > t:
t^  t
s
= 


s

;
where
 (z)  2405
448
  3
4
p
x2   18x+ 49  613
448
x
is positive in the relevant range =s < 2=7 ' 0:285:
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It follows that rm 1 has no protable deviations in the range m1  ~m (t; !) + 2t. In
the particular case where ! = 0, we saw in the previous section that there is no protable
deviation either in the range m1  ~m (t; 0) + 2t. However, when ! > 0, rm 1 may seek
to avoid the loss on consumers interested only in weak products; as a result, it may have
an incentive to increase 1, and thus m1, in the range m1 > ~m (t; !) + 2t. Indeed, for
1 > ~m (t; !) + 2t and ~m (t; !) + 2t < m1 < 1, rm 1 does not attract any one-stop
shopper and its prot thus boils down to
1 = 1D + 1! = 1D + (m1   1)! = 1 (D   !) +m1!;
which thus increase with m1 when ! > 0. It follows that a relevant deviation consists in
charging 1 > 0 and m1  max f ~m (t; !) + 2t; 1g, so as not sell to one-stop shoppers and
to consumers only interested in weak products, and focus solely on multi-stop shoppers,
that is, consumers with a location x and a shopping cost s such that
s  2(x) =  + ~  1 + t  2tx:
The resulting prot is equal to
1 = 1D =
1
s
Z 1
0
( + ~ (t; !)  1 + t  2tx) dx =
1
s
( + ~ (t; !)  1) :
It follows that the maximal prot from such deviation is given by:
D (t; !)  1
s

 + ~ (t; !)
2
2
:
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By construction, this deviation is not protable for t =  (!), as ~ ( (!) ; !) = 0, and
rms thus incur no loss on the stand-alone demand for their weak products. By contrast,
for t = 0, where ~m (0; !) = 0 and, using (11) and (12), the equilibrium margin on weak
products and the demand from multi-stop shoppers are given by:
~ (0; !) =  ~ (0; !) + s! =     s!
3
;
D (0; !) =
~ (0; !)
s
=
 + 2s!
3s
;
the deviation prot exceeds the equilibrium prot whenever ! > 0:
D (0; !)   (0; !) = 1
s

 + ~ (0; !)
2
2
+ ~ (0; !) [D (0; !)  !] = 1
12
! (4   s!) ;
where the right-hand side is positive for !  ! = =3s. As the equilibrium and deviation
prots are both continuous in t, it follows that there exists  (!) 2 [0;  (!)], where
moreover  (!) > 0 for ! > 0, such that, for any !  !, the deviation is not protable
for t 2 [ (!) ;  (!)].
D Product Choice
D.1 Proof of Proposition 5
We suppose here that rm 1 benets from a comparative advantage 1 > 0 in market A,
which exceeds rm 2s comparative advantage 2 in market B.
Consider rst the case where rm 1 enjoys a comparative advantage over both prod-
ucts; that is, 2  0. Intuitively, rm 1 then wins the competition in both markets;
indeed, a standard asymmetric Bertrand competition argument shows that there exists a
unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, in which rm 2 o¤ers both products at cost,
whereas rm 1 supplies all consumers and charges on each product a margin reecting its
comparative advantage over that product.
Consider now the case where rms have asymmetric comparative advantages in the
two markets; that is, 1 =  and 2 =  > 0, where:
  uA1   cA1  
 
uA2   cA2

>   uB2   cB2  
 
uB1   cB1

> 0:
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Firm 1 therefore enjoys market power over one-stop shoppers, as it o¤ers a more attractive
basket:
w1   w2 =     > 0;
where w1  uA1   cA1 +uB1   cB1 and w2  uA2   cA2 +uB2   cB2 denote the surpluses generated
by the two rmso¤erings.
The following Lemma extends the insights of Lemma 1 and shows that, in equilibrium,
rm 2 then still o¤ers its basket at cost whereas rm 1 attracts all one-stop shoppers and
charge them a positive total margin reecting its competitive advantage:
Lemma 7 Under Assumption A, in equilibrium:
(i) there are both multi-stop shoppers and one-stop shoppers;
(ii) multi-stop shoppers buy rmsstrong products, A1 and B2; and
(iii) in a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, m1 =     > m2 = 0.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as for Lemma 1.
 Claim 1bis: Some consumers are active in equilibrium. The proof of Claim 1 holds
unchanged.
 Claim 2bis: If there are active one-stop shoppers in equilibrium, then m1 =     >
m2 = 0. The same arguments as for Claim 2 can be used to show that m1 = m2 +
   , m2  0 and m1  0. Furthermore, rm 1 must attract all one-stop shoppers:
otherwise, if m2 < 0 then rm 2 would benet from slightly increasing its margin on the
product not purchased by multi-stop shoppers, so as to avoid the loss made on one-stop
shoppers without substantially a¤ecting any prot obtained frommulti-stop shoppers; and
if insteadm2 = 0 (implyingm1 > 0), then rm 1 would benet from slightly decreasing its
margin on the product not purchased by multi-stop shoppers, so as to attract all one-stop
shoppers, without substantially a¤ecting any prot from multi-stop shoppers. Finally,
the only equilibrium surviving trembling hand perfection is the one where m2 = 0, and
thus m1 =    .
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 Claim 3bis: In equilibrium, active multi-stop shoppers buy the strong products. The
reasoning underlying Claim 3 can be used with some adjustment.10 If there are no one-
stop shoppers, then each rm i must charge i  0 (otherwise, it would make a loss) and
i  i (otherwise, consumers would buy both products from it); keeping i unchanged,
rm i would however increase its prot by charging ~i = j + i   " > 0, so as to sell
its strong product to all previously active consumers (and possibly attract additional,
protable one-stop shoppers). If instead there are some one-stop shoppers as well, then
m2 = 0 (from Claim 2bis) and thus 2  0 (otherwise, rm 2 would make a loss),
2 =  2  0 and 1  2    < 0; rm 1 could then increase its prot by o¤ering its
weak product at cost and charging a total margin slightly below its overall comparative
advantage, so as to avoid the loss on multi-stop shoppers without substantially a¤ecting
the prot from one-stop shoppers.
 Claim 4bis: Some multi-stop shoppers are active in equilibrium. The reasoning used for
Claim 4 still applies, noting that, if all active consumers were one-stop shoppers, then we
would have (using Claim 1bis) v1 = v2 = w2  maxfv1; v2g and v12 + v12 = v1 + v2 = 2w2,
leading to v12 = v12 = w2 and 1 + 2 = . It would then again be protable for any
rm i charging i > 0 to encourage consumers to buy only its strong product, by slightly
increasing i and decreasing i by the same amount.
 Claim 5bis: Some one-stop shoppers are active in equilibrium. The reasoning underlying
Claim 5 can be used with some adjustment.11 Starting from a candidate equilibrium with
multi-stop shoppers only, the same reasoning shows that rm i would protably deviate
by reducing the margin on its weak product, so as to convert consumers to one-stop
shopping, whenever ~i > 0, where
~i 
wi   j + j   i
2
:
By construction, we have:
~1 + ~2 =
w1 + w2   1   2
2
= uA2   cA2 + uB1   cB1 > 0:
10For the case where there are one-stop shoppers as well, the original argument relies on m1 = m2 = 0,
which no longer holds.
11For the case where 2 < 1, the original argument requires w2  , which may not hold.
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Hence, ~i > 0 for at least one rm i, and that rm could protably deviate.
Claims 4bis and 5bis establish part (i) of the Lemma; part (ii) then follows from Claim
3bis, while part (iii) follows from Claim 2bis.
Hence, in equilibrium, one-stop shoppers obtain a consumer value
v1 = w1  m1 = w2;
whereas multi-stop shoppers obtain (noting that uA1   cA1 + uB2   cB2 = w1 +  = w2 + ):
v12 = w2 +    1   2:
The multi-stop shopping threshold thus becomes:
 = v12   v1 =    1   2 =  + 1   2;
where 1 = m1   1 =       1 denotes rm 1s margin on its weak product.
As rm 1 sells both products to one-stop shoppers and, in addition, sells its strong
product to multi-stop shoppers, its prot can be expressed as:
1 = 1F () +m1 [F (v1)  F ()]
= m1F (w1  m1)  1F ( + 1   2) :
This prot is additively separable and quasi-concave in m1 and 1. Hence, maximizing it
with respect to m1      and to 1leads rm 1 to charge
m1 = min

mM1 ;
   	 ;
where
mM1  arg max
m1
fm1F (w1  m1)g ;
and to subsidize its weak product: its best response is such that:
1 =  h () < 0:
As rm 2 only supplies multi-stop shoppers, to whom it sells its strong product, its
prot is given by:
2 = 2F ( + 1   2) ;
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and thus chooses
2 = h () > 0:
Hence, the unique candidate equilibrium is such that:  1 = 2 = h ( ), where   =
j 1 (). Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition, it is straightforward to
check that these strategies (together with m1 = min

mM1 ;
   	 and m2 = 0) constitute
indeed an equilibrium. Obviously, no rm i can make a prot by o¤ering its weak product
to multi-stop shoppers, as (noting that 1    = 2    =      h ( )) it would have
to charge i       h ( ) < 0 to attract them. Furthermore, rm 2 cannot make a
prot from one-stop shoppers either, as it would have to sell its basket (weakly) below
cost to attract them. Hence, rm 2s deviation prot cannot exceed 2F (), where  =
minf + 1   2;  + 2   1g; but then:
2F ()  2F ( + 1   2)  ;
where the inequality comes from the fact that the prot function 2F ( + 

1   2) is
quasi-concave in 2, from the monotonicity of h (), and, by construction, maximal for
2 = 

2. As for rm 1, its deviation prot cannot exceed
m1 [F (v1)  F ()] + 1F () = m1F (w1  m1)  1F () ;
where  = minf + 1   2;  + 2   1g. Hence, it is optimal to choose 1 < 0, which in
turn implies that this prot cannot exceed
m1F (w1  m1)  1F ( + 1   2) ;
which is separable in m1 and 1, and by construction maximal for m1 = min

mM1 ;
   	
and 1 =  h ( ).
D.2 Proof of Proposition 6
We consider here the setting with endogenous improvement decisions in which: (i) initially,
rmso¤erings generate the same surplus wA in market A and wB in market B; and (ii)
in a rst stage, each rm i = 1; 2 chooses to improve its products Ai and Bi by Ai  0
and Bi  0, respectively, subject to the constraint that the total improvement cannot
exceed : i  Ai + Bi  . Firms then choose their prices.
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We consider two variants, depending on the observability of improvement decisions
made in the rst stage. In both situations, we however assume that consumers are fully
aware of rmsmoves before making their own shopping decisions. When improvement
decisions are publicly observed, one rms prices can be contingent on both rms im-
provement decisions; the game is thus as follows:
 Stage 1: each rm i = 1; 2 chooses (Ai ;Bi) 2 S 

(A;B) 2 R2+ j A + B  
	
;
these decisions are simultaneous and publicly observed by the rival rm and con-
sumers.
 Stage 2: having observed all value-improvement decisions, rms simultaneously set
the prices for their products; these price decisions are public.
When instead rmsimprovement decisions are private, each rm can adjust its prices
as a function of its own product improvements, but cannot respond to the other rms
improvement decisions; the above two stages then boil down to a single stage, as follows:
 Each rm i = 1; 2 chooses (Ai ;Bi) 2 S 

(A;B) 2 R2+ j A + B  
	
and
its prices for its products; all decisions are simultaneous and publicly observed by
consumers.
In both variants, we look for the subgame trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria of
the game,12 and rst focus on pure strategies, before turning to mixed strategies.
D.2.1 Pure strategies
We rst assume that improvement decisions are public, before addressing the case of
private improvement decisions.
Public improvement decisions. We rst note that, in equilibrium, each rm obtains
a comparative advantage in one of the markets. To see this, suppose instead that rm i,
say, ends up with no comparative advantage in any market. From Proposition 5, it then
obtains zero prot. However, as Aj + Bj  , there is at least one market in which
12In case of private improvement decisions, subgame perfection still applies to consumersresponse.
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rm j does not improve its product by ; hence, by using its own endowment  in that
market, rm i could obtain a net advantage and earn a positive prot.
Hence, in equilibrium, one rm obtains a comparative advantage in one market,
whereas the other rm obtains a comparative advantage in the other market. Without
loss of generality, suppose that rm 1 obtains its comparative advantage in market A, and
rm 2 obtains it in market B. We thus have:
1 = A1  A2 > 0 and 2 = B1  B2 > 0:
Without loss of generality, suppose that rm i, say, ends up with a weakly greater com-
parative advantage (that is, i =    = j); from Proposition 5, the prots of the two
rms can then be expressed as:
i
 
; 

= m
 
; 

F
 
wA + wB +   m
 
; 

+  () ;
j () = 
 () ;
where:
  ()   ()F (  ()), where   () = j 1 () and  () = h (  ()), and thus:
d
d
() = 1 + h
0 ( )
1 + 2h0 ( )
F ( ) > 0: (16)
 m  ;  = minmM   ;    	, where
mM ()  arg max
m
fmF (wA + wB +   m)g ;
and thus (using vi = wA + wB +   m
 
; 

):
@i
@
= F (vi ) > 0:
It follows that both rms wish to increase their own comparative advantage; hence, in
equilibrium:
 Both rms exhaust their endowments: 1 = 2 = ; indeed, any rm l that does
not exhaust its endowment (i.e., l < ) could increase its prot by allocating the
unused part of it ( l) to the product on which it already enjoys a comparative
advantage, so as to increase l.
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 Each rm targets a single product: A1 = B2 =  (and thus A2 = B1 = 0).
For example, starting from A1 <  and B1 =  A1 > 0, rm 1 could increase
its prot by reducing B1 and allocating the saved endowment to product A. A
similar reasoning applies to rm 2.
It follows that, in equilibrium, one rm uses its full endowment to improve product
A, whereas the other uses it to improve product B. We thus have 1 = 2 =  and the
resulting equilibrium prots are
1 = 

2 = 
 () :
Private improvement decisions. We rst note that, again, in equilibrium each rm
obtains a comparative advantage in one of the markets. To see this, consider a candidate
equilibrium in which rm i, say, ends up with no comparative advantage in any market. A
standard Bertrand argument then ensures that rm i then obtains zero prot. However, as
Aj + Bj  , there is at least one market in which rm j does not improve its product
by ; hence, by using its own endowment  in that market, rm i could obtain a net
advantage in that market and, by increasing its own margin in that market accordingly,
it could earn a positive prot.
Second, in equilibrium both rms fully use their improvement capability (i.e., Ai +
Bi =  for i = 1; 2). Suppose instead thatAi+Bi <  for some i = 1; 2. Firm i could
then increase its improvement in the market in which it has a comparative advantage,
and increase its margin in that market by the same amount (or slightly less than that,
in case of ties). This would have no impact on consumersdemands, and would increase
rm is prot from that product.
It follows that, in equilibrium, one rm invests  in one product, and the other rm
invest  in the other product. The associated price equilibrium is then such that each
rm charges  =  () on its strong product and  =   () on its weak product.
Conversely, the above candidate equilibrium constitutes indeed an equilibrium. To see
this, suppose that rm j invests  in market B, say, charges a margin  () in that
market, and o¤ers its basket at cost. Suppose further that rm i deviates by investing 
in market A and (without loss of generality, in the light of the above remarks)     in
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market B. As rm j o¤ers its basket at cost, rm i cannot earn any prot from one-stop
shoppers. Hence, it can make a prot only from selling one product to multi-stop shoppers.
Obviously that product must be rm is strong product, that is, product A (as rm j
invests  in product B). Furthermore, to avoid any losses, we can restrict attention to
deviations in which rm i only o¤ers product A. Thus, without loss of generality, consider
a deviation in which rm i invests  in product A, charges a margin  on that product,
and does not o¤er product B (or o¤ers it at a prohibitively high price). Firm is prot is
then given by:
F (      ()) :
Maximizing this prot leads to  =  and  =  ().
D.2.2 Mixed strategies
We now turn to mixed strategies. We will rely on the following Lemma:
Lemma 8 Let ^ ()  max F (   ) and  ()   ()F (  ()) respectively denote
the monopoly prot obtained from a comparative advantage , and the equilibrium prot
described above. We have:
(i) ^ (0) = 0, ^0 () > 0 and ^00 () > 0; and
(ii) ^ (0) = 0 and ^0 () > 0; if in addition h (s) is weakly concave in s, then  () is
convex in .
Proof. We start with the comparative statics for ^ (). Obviously, ^ (0) = 0. Further-
more, letting      , it is useful to express ^ () as:
^ () = max

(   )F () ;
where, from the monotonicity of h (), the expression (   )F () is strictly quasi-concave
in  and maximal for ^ () = l 1 (), where l (s)  s + h (s) is strictly increasing in s.
Using the envelope theorem, we have:
^0 () = F (^ ()) ;
^00 () = f (^ ()) ^ 0 () =
f (^ ())
1 + h0 (^ ())
> 0:
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We now turn to  (), which can be expressed as:
 () = ^ (    ()) :
Hence:
d
d
() = ^0 (    ())

1  d

d
()

:
Using  () = h (  ()) and   () + 2h (  ()) = , this derivative can be expressed as:
d
d
() = ^0 (    ())

1  h0 (  ()) d

d
()

= ^0 (    ())

1  h
0 (  ())
1 + 2h0 (  ())

= ^0 (    ()) 1 + h
0 (  ())
1 + 2h0 (  ())
:
It follows that:
d2
d2
() = ^00 (    ())

1  d

d
()

1 + h0 (  ())
1 + 2h0 (  ())
+^0 (    ())
  h00 (  ())
[1 + 2h0 (  ())]2

d 
d
()
= ^00 (    ()) [1 + h
0 (  ())]2
[1 + 2h0 (  ())]2
  ^0 (    ()) h
0 (  ())h00 (  ())
[1 + 2h0 (  ())]3
;
where, in the last expression, the rst term is positive (as ^00 () > 0) and the second term
is non-negative if h00 ()  0 (as ^0 () > 0 and h0 () > 0).
We now show that there exists an equilibrium in which rms invests  in either
product with equal probability. We rst consider private improvement decisions, before
addressing the case of public improvement decisions.
Private improvement decisions. Suppose that improvement decisions are private,
and consider the following symmetric candidate equilibrium: rms always o¤er their
baskets at cost, invest  and charge  () on product A with probability 1=2, and
do the same on product B with complementary probability 1=2. Suppose that rm j
adopts this strategy, and that in response rm i invests A 2 [0;] in product A and
B 2 [0; A] in product B. With probability 1=2, rm j invests  on product A,
in which case it obtains a comparative advantage  A on that product, whereas rm
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i obtains a comparative advantage B on product B. With complementary probability
1=2, rm j invests  on product B, in which case it obtains a comparative advantage
  B on product B, whereas rm i obtains a comparative advantage A on product
A. As rm j always invests  in total, and o¤ers its basket at cost, rm i cannot obtain
a prot from one-stop shoppers. Hence, it can only earn a prot by selling a single prod-
uct to multi-stop shoppers. Furthermore, charging h < 0 on some product h = A;B is
weakly dominated by selling product h at cost: (i) whenever some multi-stop shoppers
buy product h from rm i, the change improves rm is prot; and (ii) whenever some
one-stop shoppers buy both products from rm i, implying that rm is total margin
must be negative, the change again improves rm is prot, by deterring these one-stop
shoppers. Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to rm is charging
h  0 on product h = A;B. As rm j always charges  () > 0 on its strong product,
it follows that multi-stop shoppers always combine rmsstrong products. Hence, rm is
expected prot is at most equal to:
ei =
1
2
 BF (B   B    ()) +
1
2
 AF (A   A    ())
 ^ (B   
 ()) + ^ (A    ())
2
 ^ (B   
 ()) + ^ ( B    ())
2
;
where the rst inequality stems from the denition of ^ () and the second one follows
from A   B. The convexity of ^ () then implies that rm i cannot do better than
investing  in either product (i.e., either B = 0, or B = ). Furthermore, in case it
invests  in product h 2 fA;Bg, it cannot do better than o¤ering its basket at cost and
charging  () on product h.
Public improvement decisions. Suppose now that improvement decisions are public,
and consider the following symmetric candidate equilibrium in which, in the rst stage,
rms invest  in either product with equal probability; along the equilibrium path, they
then o¤er their baskets at cost, and charge  () on their strong products.
Suppose that rm j invests in either product with equal probability in the rst stage,
and that in response rm i invests A 2 [0;] in product A, and B 2 [0; A] in
product B. With probability 1=2, rm j invests  on product A, in which case it obtains
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a comparative advantage    A on that product, whereas rm i obtains a weaker
comparative advantage B     A on product B. With complementary probability
1=2, rm j invests  on product B, in which case it obtains a comparative advantage
   B on product B, whereas rm i obtains a weaker comparative advantage A 
 B on product A. From Proposition 5, rm is expected prot is therefore equal to:
ei =
 (B) +  (A)
2
 
 (B) +  ( B)
2
;
where the inequality follows from A     B. The convexity of  () then implies
that rm i cannot do better than investing  in either product (i.e., either B = 0, or
B = ).
D.3 Endogenous investments
We consider here a variant of the previous setting in which, in stage 1, each rm i =
1; 2 chooses to improve its products Ai and Bi by Ai and Bi , respectively, at cost
C (Ai + Bi). To ensure the existence of an equilibrium in which both rms invest, we
introduce the following regularity assumptions:
Assumption C: C (0) = C 0 (0) = 0, C 00 (0) < 2f (0) =9, C 00 ()  0 and there exists 
such that C 0
 


= 1.
Also, for tractability purposes we replace Assumption A with the following assumption:
Assumption A:
(i) The shopping cost s is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function
F () with positive, continuously di¤erentiable density function f () over [0; s].
(ii) The surplus initially o¤ered by the rms (i.e., absent value improvements) is large
enough to ensure full participation: w  wA + wB > s.
We rst note that at least one rm invests:
Claim 9 In any equilibrium, at least one rm invests.
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Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which no rm invests. In the second stage,
head-to-head competition then yields zero prot for both rms. Suppose now that one
rm deviates and invests  > 0 in one of the products. From Proposition 5, the other rm
o¤ers its products at cost but attracts no consumer, whereas the investing rm charges a
total margin equal to m =  (doing so still enables it to serve all consumers, as it o¤ers
w +    m = w > s, implying that the monopoly margin mM (w + ) would be even
higher) and thus obtains a prot equal to:
~ ()  F (w) = :
As ~0 (0) = 1 > 0 = C 0 (0), it follows that a small deviation is protable, a contradiction.
Next, we note that rms never invest on the same products. To see this, suppose that
both rms invest on some product h 2 fA;Bg, and suppose without loss of generality
that rm i, say, invests weakly less than its rival (that is, hi  hj > 0), implying
that rm i has no comparative advantage on this market. Firm i would then protably
stop investing on product h: this would save on investment costs, without a¤ecting the
prot it achieves in any market. Therefore, in equilibrium, either the two rms invest in
di¤erent markets, or only one rm invests. In both cases, rm is investment i in its
product gives it a comparative advantage i = i in that product; hence, we can say that
rm i invests in comparative advantage i at cost C (i).
Consider the rst type of equilibrium, and suppose without loss of generality that rm
i, say, invests weakly more than rm j, so that i  j > 0. From Proposition 5, the
prots of the two rms are then given by:
i =  (i; j)  i   j +  (j) ;
j = 
 (j) ;
where  ()   ()F (  ()), where   ()  j 1 () and  ()  h (  ()), and the
expression of  (i; j) relies on the observation that rm i nds it optimal to charge the
full value of its net comparative advantage (i.e., mi = i   j), as doing so still allows it
to serve all consumers (as it o¤ers one-stop shoppers w+ i mi = w+ j > s), implying
that the monopoly margin mM (w + j) would be even higher.
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We have:
Claim 10 Under Assumptions A, B and C, the function  ()   () C () is maximal
for some  2  0; .
Proof. From the previous analysis, we have:
d
d
() =
1 + h0 (  ())
1 + 2h0 (  ())
F (  ()) < 1:
Hence,  () is decreasing for   , where C 0 ()  1. Furthermore, for  = 0, we have
 (0) =   (0) = h (0) = 0, h0 (0) = (1  h (0) f (0) =) 1; therefore:
 (0) =  (0)  C (0) = 0;
0 (0) =
1 + h0 (0)
1 + 2h0 (0)
F (0)  C 0 (0) = 0;
and:13
00 (0) =
d
d

1 + h0 (  ())
1 + 2h0 (  ())

=0
F (  (0)) +
1 + h0 (0)
1 + 2h0 (0)
f (  ())
d 
d
()

=0
  C 00 (0)
=
d
d

1 + h0 (  ())
1 + 2h0 (  ())

=0
F (0) +
1 + h0 (0)
1 + 2h0 (0)
f (0)
1 + 2h0 (0)
  C 00 (0)
=
2
9
f (0)  C 00 (0) ;
which is positive from Assumption C. Hence, there exists  2  0;  such that  () is
maximal for .
We now establish the existence of two equilibria of the rst type:
Claim 11 Under Assumptions A, B and C, in the above two-stage game there exists two
subgame (trembling-hand) perfect Nash equilibria in which: (i) in stage 1, one rm invests
13We assume here that f 00 (0) exists and is nite; this ensures that
d
d

1 + h0 ( ())
1 + 2h0 ( ())

=0
=
h0 () [ h0 () f 0 ()  h () f 00 ()]
[1 + 2h0 ()]3

=0
=  f 0 (0)
is also nite.
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 in one market (and 0 in the other market), whereas the other rm invests  2  0;  in
the other market (and 0 in the rst market); in stage 2, the second rm o¤ers its basket
at cost whereas the rst rm supplies one-stop shoppers with a total margin reecting its
net comparative advantage, m =   > 0, and both rms sell their weaker products below
cost. Furthermore, there is no other pure-strategy equilibrium in which both rms invest.
Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which both rms invest, and obtain
comparative advantages over di¤erent products. We rst note that the two rms cannot
invest to the same extent. Indeed, starting from a candidate equilibrium in which 1 =
2 = , giving the same prot  () to both rms, any rm could obtain  (
0; ) by
deviating to 0 > , and could obtain instead  (0) by deviating to 0 < . Ruling out
the rst type of deviation requires:
0 > @1 (; ) = 1  C 0 () ;
where @1 (; ) denotes the partial derivative of the function  (; ) with respect to its rst
argument; ruling the second type of deviation requires instead:
0 <
d
d
() =
1 + h0 (  ())
1 + 2h0 (  ())
F (  ())  C 0 () :
Combining both conditions yields:
1 <
1 + h0 (  ())
1 + 2h0 (  ())
F (  ()) ;
a contradiction (as h0 () > 0 and F ()  1).
Therefore, one rm, say rm i, must invest more than the other: i > j > 0, implying
that rm i obtains i =  (i; j) whereas rm j obtains j =  (j). The rst-order
condition for rm i then yields i = , and rm js best-response in the range j  
is given by j = . The two rms thus obtain i =     +  () and j =  (). To
complete the proof, it su¢ ces to check that no rm can benet from a large deviation
which would lead to i  j. For rm i, a deviation to i   is not protable, as:
 (i)  C (i)  max

f ()  C ()g =  () <     +  () = i :
Likewise, for rm j, a deviation to j   is not protable either, as:
j+
   C ()  max

fj   C ()g+
 

  =    C    max

f ()  C ()g = j :
52
Finally, we provide a condition ensuring that no other pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
Assumption D:
max




  

2

  C ()

> 0:
We have:
Claim 12 Under Assumptions A, B, C and D, in the above two-stage game there is no
other subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies than the ones described in Claim
11.
Proof. Given the above analysis, it su¢ ces to rule equilibria of the second type, where
only one rm invests. Thus, without loss of generality, consider a candidate equilibrium
in which rm 1, say, invests A1 > 0 and B1  0, whereas rm 2 does not invest:
A2 = B2 = 0. Firm 2 thus obtains zero prot, whereas rm 1 obtains a comparative
advantage hi = hi in each product h = A;B, and supplies all consumers with a total
margin reecting its overall competitive advantage: m1 = A1 + B1 ; its prot is thus
equal to
1 = A1 + B1   C (A1 + B1) ;
leading it to choose A and 

B such that 

A + 

B =
.
By construction, given that rm 2 does not invest, rm 1 has no incentive to deviate
from these investment levels. We now consider possible deviations by rm 2, and denote
by A and B the deviating investment levels.
It is never optimal for rm 2 to invest in a product if it does not obtain a compara-
tive advantage in that product. Furthermore, it cannot pay for rm 2 to invest in both
products: by choosing A > 

A and B > 

B, rm 2 obtains:
^ ()        C () < 0;
where  = A+B >  and the inequality follows from ^
 


= 0 and ^
0
() = 1 C 0 () < 0
for  > . Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations that
aim at obtaining a comparative advantage in a single market; that is, h =  > 

h and
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k = 0, for some h 6= k 2 fA;Bg. In addition, it would not be optimal for rm 2 to obtain
a larger comparative advantage than rm 1: by choosing  > , rm 2 obtains
    +  (k)  C () ;
which, as C 0 () > 1 for  > , is lower than what it would obtain for  = . Hence, we
can further restrict attention to   ; rm 2 then obtains:
 (   h)  C () :
It follows that such an equilibrium exists if and only if:
max

f (  min fA; Bg)  C ()g  0;
where A+ 

B =
. As this condition is the least demanding for A = 

B =
=2, condition
D rules out the existence of such an equilibrium.
Together, Claims 9, 11 and 12 yield:
Proposition 13 In the above two-stage game:
(i) Under Assumptions A, B, C, there are two subgame (trembling-hand) perfect Nash
equilibria, in which: (i) in stage 1, one rm invests  in one market (and 0 in the
other market), whereas the other rm invests  <  in the other market (and 0 in
the rst market); in stage 2, the second rm o¤ers its basket at cost whereas the
rst rm supplies one-stop shoppers and charges them a total margin m =    ,
and both rms sell their weaker products below cost.
(ii) If Assumption D also holds, then there is no other equilibrium in pure strategies.
E RBC laws
We rst characterize the mixed-strategy equilibrium that arise under RBC laws and then
examine the impact of RBC laws on consumer surplus and welfare. For the sake of
exposition, we assume that Assumption A holds. Building on the analysis of Section
B.1.1, it is straightforward to show that the analysis carries over when the distribution of
the shopping cost is su¢ ciently dispersed, e.g., if it is distributed over [0; s] with s > w.
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E.1 Proof of Proposition 8
We rst show that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium under RBC laws. We
note that in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium each rm i = 1; 2 would have to charge
i; i  0, so as to satisfy the RBC laws, and from Proposition 3 we have:
Corollary 1 Under RBC laws, in any equilibrium, each rm must obtain a positive prot;
therefore, each rm should attract some consumers and sell them at least one product with
a positive margin.
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 7, which implies that under RBC laws,
in any equilibrium, each rm i must obtain a prot at least equal to i   > 0.
It follows that, in any equilibrium with pure strategies, some consumers must be active.
We successively consider the cases in which one-stop shoppers would be supplied by both
rms, one rm, or none (that is, only multi-stop shoppers would be active).
Case (1): Both rms supply one-stop shoppers. This case can only arise when
the two rms o¤er one-stop shoppers the same positive value, v1 = v2 > 0, implying
m^1 = m^2. By construction, at least one rm, say rm i, attracts only a fraction of these
one-stop shoppers; and from Corollary 1, rm i must sell at least one good with a positive
margin. Suppose rm i deviates by reducing that margin by ":
 this deviation enables rm i to attract all active one-stop shoppers; and
 in addition, the relevant thresholds for multi-stop shopping, which can initially be
expressed as:
 = v12  maxfv1; v2g = v12   vi =    ^j + ^i;
 = v12  maxfv1; v2g = v12   vi =     ^j + ^i;
can only be lowered by the reduction of rm is margin.14 Therefore:
 if initially there are only one-stop shoppers, then the deviation does not trans-
form any of them into multi-stop shoppers; and
14More precisely, as ~vi > vj , these thresholds either become ~ = ~v12   ~vi =    " and ~ = ~v12   ~vi = 
(if ~i = i   " and ~i = i), or ~ =  and ~ = ~   " (if ~i = i   " and ~i = i).
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 if instead there are initially multi-stop shoppers as well, then the deviation
can only transform marginal multi-stop shoppers into one-stop shoppers, from
which rm i makes a higher prot.
It follows that, for " small enough, the deviation is protable.
Case (2): One rm supplies one-stop shoppers. This case arises when, for
instance, vi > vj (> 0), implying m^j > m^i, in which case rm i attracts all one-stop
shoppers. From Corollary 1, rm j must also obtain a prot, implying that some multi-
stop shoppers must also be active. For this to be the case, rm i must o¤er a positive
value, vmsi > 0, on the product they target. It is moreover straightforward to see that
rm i must o¤er a positive value, vosi  vi   vmsi > 0, on its other product as well.
Starting from a situation where it would o¤er no value on this other product, reducing its
margin so as to o¤er a slightly positive value on that product (e.g., ~vosi = " > 0) would
not only enable rm i to sell both of its products to one-stop shoppers (with an almost
fullmargin on the other product) but, by slightly increasing its overall value, from vi to
~vi = vi + ", it would also transform marginal multi-stop shoppers into (more protable)
one-stop shoppers, buying both products from rm i. Therefore, we can restrict attention
to rm is margins such that i < wi and i < wi. As from Corollary 1, rm i must sell
at least one good with a positive margin. We thus have (mj ) m^j > m^i = mi > 0 and
rm is prot can be expressed as:
i = mi [F (vi)  F ()] +mmsi F (ms)
= miF (vi) mosi F (ms) ;
where ms denotes the threshold for multi-stop shopping, whereas mmsi and m
os
i = mi  
mmsi respectively denote rm is margins on the product bought by multi-stop shoppers
(as well as by one-stop shoppers), and on the other product (bought only by one-stop
shoppers).15 Note that charging a zero margin on the product bought by multi-stop
shoppers is never optimal: starting from mmsi = 0, deviating to ~m
ms
i = " (where " is
15If multi-stop shoppers buy strong products, we thus have ms =  = v12 vi, mms = i andmos = i;
if instead multi-stop shoppers buy weak products, we have ms =  = v12   vi, mms = i and mos = i.
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positive but small) and ~mosi = mi   " allows rm i to earn the same prot from one-
stop shoppers, but, in addition, it now derives a positive prot from multi-stop shoppers.
Moreover, the deviation keeps vi unchanged but reduces the multi-stop shopping threshold
ms to ~ms = ms   ", and thus transforms marginal multi-stop shoppers into one-stop
shoppers, fromwhich rm imakes more prot. Thus, in what follows, we focus onmmsi > 0
and distinguish two cases, depending on whether or not rm i charges the monopoly prot-
maximizing margin m  arg maxmmF (w  m) (which, given the monotonicity of the
inverse hazard rate h (), is uniquely dened by h (w  m) = m):
 if mi 6= m, then suppose that rm i adjusts its margin on the product bought by
multi-stop shoppers to ~mmsi = m
ms
i + " (m
  mi), where " > 0 is small enough to
ensure that ~mi < m^j and ~mmsi > 0. Such a deviation does not change the threshold
ms (which depends on rm is prices only throughmosi ), and rm is prot becomes:
~i = (mi + " (m
  mi))F (vi   " (m  mi)) mosi F (ms) :
The monotonicity of the inverse hazard rate h () ensures that the rst term increases
with " as long as ~mi < m, implying that such a deviation is protable;
 if mi = m, then rm j can benet from undercutting its rival. Firm js prot is
given by:
j = m
ms
j F (
ms) ;
where mmsj denotes rm js margin on the product bought by multi-stop shoppers.
Using:
ms = vmsi + v
ms
j   vi  vmsj < w  mmsj ;
where the rst inequality stems from vi = vosi + v
ms
i  vmsi ,16 and the second follows
from the fact that the surplus generated by any single product cannot exceed w, we
have:
j = m
ms
j F (
ms) < mmsj F
 
w  mmsj
    mF (w  m) : (17)
That is, the maximum prot that rm j can earn from multi-stop shoppers is strictly
lower than the monopoly prot derived from one-stop shoppers. Consider now rm
js deviation to ~j = maxfi      "=2; 0g and ~j = m   "  ~j, for some " > 0:
16From the remarks above, this inequality is actually strict, as vosi > 0.
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 if i > , then for " small enough, ~j = i      "=2
 
< wi    = wj

and
~j = i +   "=2 (< wi +  = wj), implying ~v12 = ~v12 = vi + "=2 < ~vj = vi + ",
and thus ~ = ~ =  "=2 < 0. Therefore, rm j transforms all multi-stop
shoppers into one-stop shoppers, and attracts all one-stop shoppers to whom
it charges a total margin of ~mj = m   "; and
 if, instead, i  , which implies that multi-stop shoppers buy strong prod-
ucts,17 then ~j = 0 and ~j = m
   " (note that i   then implies ~j < m =
i + i   + wi = wj); rm j then attracts all one-stop shoppers and also
serves any remaining multi-stop shoppers (who still buy strong products, as
~ = ~v12   ~vj =    i  0), but makes the same margin ~mj = ~j = m   " on
both types of shoppers; and
 in both cases, the deviation yields a prot:
~j = ~mjF (~vj) = (m
   ")F (w  m + ") ;
which, from (17), makes the deviation protable for " small enough.
Case (3): There only exist multi-stop shoppers. This case arises when vms 
vms1 + v
ms
2  2 max fv1; v2g,18 where, as before, vmsi denotes the value o¤ered by rm i on
the product targeted at multi-stop shoppers. By construction, however, vi = vmsi + v
os
i ,
where, as before, vosi denotes the value o¤ered by rm i on its other product. The rst
17Multi-stop shoppers would buy weak products only if v12 > vi, or  = v12   vi =     ^j + ^i > 0,
which (using ^i = i, as noted above) implies i >  + ^j  .
18We must have:
vms   2s  0 =) vms   2s  fv1; v2g   s;
which amounts to:
s  vms=2 =) s  vms  max fv1; v2g ;
or max fv1; v2g  vms   vms=2 = vms=2.
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condition therefore implies:19
vms1 = v
ms
2 =
vms
2
> vos1 = v
os
2 = 0:
But then any rm i can protably deviate by charging a positive but non-prohibitive
margin on its other product, leaving a positive value ~vosi > 0. This deviation does not
a¤ect the value o¤ered to multi-stop shoppers, vms, but it increases the value o¤ered to
one-stop shoppers to:
~vi = v
ms
i + ~v
os
i =
vms
2
+ ~vosi >
vms
2
:
This deviation thus induces some of the initial multi-stop shoppers (namely, those whose
shopping costs lie between ~ms = vms   ~vi and vms=2) to buy both products from rm i,
enabling rm i to earn an additional prot from selling its other product, and it, moreover,
attracts more one-stop shoppers (namely, those whose shopping cost lies between vms=2
and ~vi), generating yet another prot.
To summarize, no pure-strategy satisfying i  0 and i  0 for i 2 f1; 2g can form
a Nash equilibrium in any of the above congurations; hence, there is no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium when below-cost pricing is prohibited.
We now characterize the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Firm is prot, as a function of
the two rmsmargins on their strong products, 1 and 2, is given by:
bi
 
i; j
 
8<: iF (w   i) if i < j;iF (   i) if i > j:
In the rst case (i < j), rm i sells its strong product to both one-stop and multi-
stop shoppers, whereas in the second case (i > j), it sells its strong product only to
multi-stop shoppers.
19To see this, note that the condition vms  2vj amounts to:
vms1 + v
ms
2  2
 
vmsj + v
os
j

() vmsi   vmsj  2vosj :
As vosj cannot be negative (consumers can always opt out), and the condition v
ms  2vj must hold for
j 2 f1; 2g, it follows that 0  vms1   vms2  0, or vms1 = vms2 ; this, in turn, implies 0  vosj  0, or vosj = 0,
for j 2 f1; 2g.
59
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which each rm i: (i) sells its weak product at
cost; (ii) randomizes the margin i on its strong product according to a distribution G ()
over some interval with continuous density g (); and (iii) obtains an expected prot equal
to the minmax, . By construction, the bounds of the support of the distribution must
be given by   arg max F (   ) and F
 
w    = .
Consider consumersresponses to given margins i and j:
 consumers buy both goods from rm i if:
rm i undercuts its rival:
j  i;
 one-stop shopping is valuable:
s  vi = w   i;
 and is more valuable than multi-stop shopping:
s  v12   vi =    j; and
 consumers instead engage in multi-stop shopping if:
s  v12  maxfv1; v2g;
which amounts to:
s     i and s     j:
Figure 1 depicts the consumersresponse.
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Firm is expected prot can then be expressed as:
iE
 
DOSSi +D
MSS

;
where DOSSi represents the demand from one-stop shoppers going to rm i, and D
MSS is
the demand from multi-stop shoppers. As rm js margin is distributed according to the
distribution function G
 
j

, rm is expected prot can be written as:
 (i) = i [(1 G (i))F (w   i) +G (i)F (   i)]
= i fF (w   i) G (i) [F (w   i)  F (   i)]g :
Hence, for a rm to obtain its minmax prot , we must have, for all :
 fF (w   ) G () [F (w   )  F (   )]g = ;
or:
G ()  F (w   )  
F (w   )  F (   ) : (18)
By construction, the function G () dened by (18) is such that G   = 0 and G () = 1;
it remains to conrm that it is increasing in  in the range

; 

. Di¤erentiating (18)
with respect to , we have:
G0 () =
[   F (   )] [F (w   )  f(w   )] + [F (w   )  ] [F (   )  f (   )]
[F (w   )  F (   )]2 :
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As w > , and given the denition of  and , the functions F (w  ) and F (  ) are
both increasing in the range

; 

, and moreover satisfy F (w  ) = F (  ) =  and
F (w   ) >  > F (   ) for  <  < . It follows that G0 () = 0 and G0 () > 0 for
   < .
We now show that the functionG () supports a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
To see this, consider rm is best response when its rival, rm j, adopts the above strategy.
If rm i were to charge a total margin mi > , one-stop shoppers would go to the
rival and multi-stop shoppers become those consumers whose shopping cost is lower than
v12 vj =  i; hence, rm i would earn a prot equal to iF (   i)  . Thus, without
loss of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations that are such that mi  .
Suppose rst that rm i prices its weak product above cost (i.e., its total margin
satises mi > i), and consider the impact of an increase in the margin on the strong
product, i, keeping constant the total margin mi. We distinguish between two cases,
depending on which rm o¤ers the best prices.
 When the realization of the rivals margin is such that mj
 
= j

> mi, one-stop shop-
pers (if any) favor rm i, and thus the multi-stop shopping threshold is  = v12   vi =
 +mi   i   j. Two cases may then arise:
 if  = v12   vi  vi, which amounts to vi  v12=2, consumers whose shopping costs
lie below  engage in multi-stop shopping and buy strong products, whereas those
with s between  and vi buy both products from rm i. Hence, increasing i:
 increases the prot earned by selling the strong product to all active consumers
(that is, those with s  vi = w  mi); and
 also induces some multi-stop shoppers to buy rm is weak product as well,
which further enhances rm is prot.
 if instead vi < v12=2, consumers whose shopping costs lie below v12=2 engage in
multi-stop shopping and buy strong products, and all other consumers are inactive.
Hence, rm is prot is equal to:
i (i) = iF
v12
2

= iF

w +    1   2
2

;
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which increases with i: the derivative is equal to:
0i (i) = F
v12
2

  if
 
v12
2

2
=
h
2h
v12
2

  i
i f  v12
2

2
;
where the term in brackets is positive, as vi < v12=2 implies 2h (v12=2) > h (v12=2) >
h (vi) = h (w  mi) > mi > i (where the penultimate inequality stems frommi  ,
the function miF (w  mi) being increasing in mi in that range).
When, instead, the realization of the rivals margin is such thatmj
 
= j

< mi, one-stop
shoppers (if any) favor rm j; hence, rm i only sells (its strong product) to multi-stop
shoppers, and the multi-stop shopping threshold is  = v12   vj =    i. Two cases may
again arise:
 if  = v12   vj  vi, which amounts to vj  v12=2, all consumers whose shopping
costs lie below  engage in multi-stop shopping, and so rm is prot is equal to:
i (i) = iF () = iF (   i) ;
which increases with i on the relevant range i  ; and
 if instead vj < v12=2, only those consumers with s below v12=2 engage in multi-stop
shopping, and so rm is prot is equal to i (i) = iF
 
v12
2

. The same reasoning
as above then shows that this prot again increases with i.
Therefore, it is never optimal for a rm to price its weak product above cost: starting
from i < mi, raising i would always increase rm is ex post prot, and would thus
increase its expected prot as well.
Suppose now that rm i sells its weak product at cost: mi = i. By construction,
choosing any i in the range

; 

yields the same expected prot, . It remains to conrm
that it is not protable to pick a margin i outside the support of G:
 choosing i <  attracts all one-stop shoppers and thus yields an expected prot
equal to i (i) = iF (w   i), which increases in i for i  , and is thus lower
than i
 


= ; and
 choosing i >  attracts no one-stop shoppers, and thus the expected prot must
be lower than iF (   i)  max F (   ) = .
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This establishes the rst part of the proposition; the rest has been established in the
main text.
E.2 Proof of Proposition 9
We now analyze the impact of banning below-cost pricing on consumer surplus. When
below-cost pricing is not prohibited, the equilibrium consumer surplus can be expressed
as:
S =
Z w
0
(w   s) f(s)ds+
Z 
0
(    s) f(s)ds
=
Z w
0
F (s)ds+
Z 
0
F (s)ds;
where the second expression relies on integration by parts. The rst term in that expression
represents the surplus that would be generated if all consumers were one-stop shoppers
(and thus bought the bundle at cost), and the second term represents the extra surplus
from multi-stop shopping. When, instead, below-cost pricing is banned, ex post (i.e., for
a given realization of the margins 1 and 2) consumer surplus can be written as:
Sb (1; 2) =
Z vb(1;2)
0

vb (1; 2)  s

f(s)ds+
Z b(1;2)
0

 b (1; 2)  s

f(s)ds
=
Z vb(1;2)
0
F (s)ds+
Z b(1;2)
0
F (s)ds:
Thus, the resulting change in ex post consumer surplus is given by:
S (1; 2) = S
b (1; 2)  S =
Z b(1;2)

F (s)ds 
Z w
vb(1;2)
F (s)ds:
Banning below-cost pricing generates two opposite e¤ects on consumer surplus. On the
one hand, the increase in multi-stop shopping (recall that  b >  ) has a positive e¤ect,
represented by the rst term in the above expression; on the other hand, one-stop shoppers
face higher prices than before, causing a loss of consumer surplus represented by the second
term. The net e¤ect depends on the value of w, , and the distribution of shopping costs,
which contribute to determining equilibrium prices.
To explore this further, we x the parameter  and examine the sign of S as a
function of the social value w. Note that   and  do not depend on w, whereas  (w) is
the lower solution to F
 
w    =  = F (   ), and thus decreases in w.
64
In the limit case where w = , the lower bound  (w) coincides with ; that is, both
rms charge  =  with probability one. As  >  (and weak products are priced
at cost, instead of being subsidized), all prices are higher than before, and thus every
consumers (expected) surplus goes down. By continuity, this remains the case as long as
weak products o¤er su¢ ciently low value (i.e., as long as w is close enough to ).
We now examine the impact of a ban on total welfare, that is, on the sum of consumer
surplus and rmsprots. When w is close to , the equilibrium margin distribution tends
to assign a probability mass of 1 on , and the impact of a ban on expected welfare then
becomes:
W = S (; ) + 2 (   )
=
Z b(;)

F (s)ds 
Z w
vb(;)
F (s)ds+ 2 (   )
= 2 (   )   (   2)   () + 2 (   ) ;
where:
 (x) =
Z x
0
F (s)ds:
The sign of W can be either positive or negative, depending on the distribution of
shopping costs. To see this, we consider the case where shopping costs are distributed
according to F (s) = (s=s)k, where s > . The hazard rate assumption is satised for any
k > 0, and:
f (s) =
k
sk
sk 1;  (x) =
sk+1
(k + 1) sk
and h (s) =
F (s)
f (s)
=
s
k
:
When below-cost pricing is not prohibited, the equilibrium is characterized by:
 = h (   2) =    2

k
,  = 
2 + k
;
  =    2 = k
2 + k
;
 = F ( ) =

2 + k
 
k
2+k
k
sk
=
1
sk

kk 
k
(k+2)k
k + 2
=
kk
sk
k+1
(k + 2)k+1
;
v = w = :
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Instead, when below-cost pricing is banned, the equilibrium is characterized as follows:
 = h (   ) =    
k
,  = 
1 + k
;
 = vb (; ) =     = k
1 + k
;
 = F (   ) = k
k
sk
k+1
(1 + k)k+1
:
Thus, banning below-cost pricing results in the following change of total welfare:
W (k; ; s) =
2kk+1
sk
k+1
(1 + k)k+2
  k
k+1
sk
k+1
(k + 1) (2 + k)k+1
  1
sk
k+1
(k + 1)
+2
kk
sk
k+1
"
1
(1 + k)k+1
  1
(k + 2)k+1
#
:
This expression is continuous in k and, as k goes to 0, it tends to 0 and its derivative tends
to  1; hence, banning below-cost pricing reduces total welfare when the distribution is
not too convex. The following graph, which represents W (k; ; s) for  = 1 and s = 1:1,
shows that banning below-cost pricing instead increases total welfare when the distribution
of shopping cost is su¢ ciently convex (namely, for k > k^ ' 2:9):
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By continuity, for w close enough to , there exists k^ (w; ) such that banning below-cost
pricing reduces total welfare when k < k^ (w; ).
Remark: upstream margins.
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As already mentioned, in the case of downstream rms (e.g., retailers), their compar-
ative advantages may be mainly driven by di¤erences in wholesale prices rather than in
quality or cost. Consider for instance the setting developed in Section 4, where super-
markets can devote resources to negotiating better conditions from their suppliers and,
in equilibrium, target di¤erent products. Total welfare must then account for the prot
of upstream suppliers. To explore this further, suppose that which rms initially face the
same wholesale price for each product, and negotiate a discount  on one or the other
product; strong products then correspond to those on which they negotiated the dis-
count, and weak productscorrespond to those on which they pay the regular wholesale
price.
To x ideas, suppose rm 1 obtained the discount on product A, which reduces the
wholesale price to from c to c   , whereas it still faces the regular wholesale price c on
product B. By contrast, rm 2 benets from the discounted wholesale price c    on
product B, but faces the regular wholesale price c on product A. Suppose further that
upstream suppliers face the same marginal cost of production, , for both products A and
B. Finally, to x ideas, assume that the discount erases the suppliers margin, so that
strong products are supplied at cost: c    = . The suppliersprot then comes solely
from the sales of the weakproducts, and is equal to
U  (c  ) [F (v)  F ()] =  [F (v)  F ()] :
Let U denote the change in suppliersbrought by RBC laws; we have:
U = 

F
 
vb
  F   b   [F (v)  F ( )]
=    F (v)  F  vb+ F   b  F (v) :
As v > vb and  b > v, it follows that U < 0: the upstream suppliers earn less prots
under RBC laws, as they reduce the number of one-stop shoppers. As a result, RBC laws
have a negative impact on the upstream industry, which degrades further its impact on
total welfare.
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E.3 Impact on expected consumer surplus
We conclude by noting that RBC laws necessarily decrease (expected) consumer surplus
when the density of the distribution of shopping costs does not increase between   and
. The impact of RBC laws on total expected consumer surplus can be expressed as the
impact on expected social welfare, minus the impact on expected industry prot:
E [S (1; 2)] = E [W (1; 2)]  E [ (1; 2)] ;
where:
E [ (12)] = 2 (   ) ;
and W (12) can be obtained by comparing the two regimes:
 when rms are allowed to price below-cost, social welfare is equal to:
W  =
Z w
0
(w   s) dF (s) +
Z 
0
(   s) dF (s) ;
where the rst term is the social welfare that would be generated if all consumers
were one-stop shoppers, and the second term represents the additional welfare from
multi-stop shopping; and
 under RBC laws, ex post social welfare is equal to:
W b (1; 2) =
Z vb(1;2)
0
(w   s) dF (s) +
Z b(1;2)
0
(   s) dF (s) ;
where:
vb (1; 2) = w  min f1; 2g and  b (1; 2) =   max f1; 2g :
Hence, the impact of a ban on ex post social welfare is given by:
W (1; 2) =
Z b(1;2)

(   s) dF (s) 
Z w
vb(1;2)
(w   s) dF (s) ; (19)
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and the impact of RBC laws on total expected consumer surplus can thus be expressed
as:
E [S (1; 2)] = E [W (1; 2)]  2 (   )
= E [W (1; 2)  2 (   )]
= E
"Z b(1;2)

(   s) dF (s) 
Z w
vb(1;2)
(w   s) dF (s)  2 (   )
#
 E
"Z b(1;2)

(   s) dF (s)  2 (   )
#
= E
"Z  maxf1;2g
 2
(   s) dF (s)  2 (   )
#
= E [ (max f1; 2g)] ;
where:
 () 
Z  
 2
(   s) dF (s)  2 (   ) :
It follows that RBC laws reduce expected consumer surplus whenever E [ ()] < 0,
where the function  () decreases as  increases:
0 () =  f (   ) < 0:
We have:
Proposition 14 If f (s) is non-increasing for s 2 [ ; ], then RBC laws reduce total
expected consumer surplus.
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that  (0)  0. Using   =    2, we have:
 (0) =
Z 

(   s) f (s) ds  2 (   )

Z 

(   s) f ( ) ds  2
=
"
 (   s)
2
2
#

 F (
)

  2F ( )
=

2
2
2
0
 F (
)

  2F ( )
= 0;
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where the rst inequality stems from the assumed monotonicity of f () on the range [ ; ]
and from the fact that:
 = max

F (   )  2F (   2) = 2;
and the equality that follows uses the rst-order condition characterizing , namely:
f ( ) = F ( ) :
It follows that  () < 0 for any  > 0, and thus:
E [S (1; 2)]  E [ (max f1; 2g)] < 0:
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